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I. INTRODUCTION
Ring Lardner, Jr. was one of the Hollywood Ten, a group of
screenwriters cited for contempt of Congress in 1947 for refusing to an-
swer the question: "Are you now or have you ever been a member of the
Communist Party?"' He eventually served nine months in federal prison
for contempt of Congress, but as soon as he refused to testify, he was
placed on a blacklist-the widespread refusal by film, radio, and televi-
sion producers to hire real or suspected Communists. Blacklisting, along
with the dismissals or denial of employment as a result of "loyalty" and
"security" investigations, truncated or distorted thousands of careers and
was an integral part of the late 1940s and 1950s period of national suspi-
cion that is now often referred to as the "McCarthy era.",2 Lardner him-
self suffered professionally and financially for years, but he gradually
recovered his career, first by writing under pseudonyms, and then, fi-
nally, in his own right. His refusal to "name names" ultimately led to his
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Careful readers may notice the difference in word formation for the two kinds of lists discussed in
this article: "blacklists" and "watch lists." Over time, the name for the 1950s lists of suspected
Communists came to be expressed in one word. That has not (yet) happened for present day compi-
lations of suspected terrorists. A search of the Westlaw law journal database reveals that "watch list"
out-numbers "watchlist" by a ratio of over 10:1 in law journals. This Article follows the majority
practice for both terms, producing non-parallel usage.
I. RING LARDNER, JR., I'D HATE MYSELF IN THE MORNING 2-3, 8-9 (2000).
2. The McCarthy era is named after Senator Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin, who investigated
and claimed to find Communists in influential positions in American society.
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recognition by some as a hero of his time. By then he was often asked,
"Can it happen again?" "Yes," he replied, "but not in the same way. 3
We are once again in a period in which potential betrayers are be-
lieved to lurk in American society. Prevention of further attacks is one of
the pillars of the post-September 11 national strategy,4 prompting meas-
ures to identify and incapacitate possible terrorists before they act.
Criminal prosecution, of course, is one form of preventive incapacitation
but is now generally deemed insufficient-both because of its high stan-
dard of proof and because it fails to deter people who are prepared to die
in a terrorist attack.5 Administrative actions to inhibit terrorists range
from denying aliens admission to the U.S. to banning individuals from
flights and detention of so-called illegal combatants.6
One of the most extensive efforts to identify the dangerous is the
growing phenomenon of terrorist watch lists: the compilation of names
of "known" or "suspected" terrorists that is then checked against selected
individuals at specified occasions, triggering certain consequences. 7
Watch lists existed even before September 11 but are now being consoli-
dated, expanded, and applied in a greater number and variety of settings.
Some of the impetus lies in the fact that "[t]he names of at least three of
the [September 11] hijackers were in information systems of the intelli-
gence community and thus potentially could have been watch listed.",8
Interest in this technique is part of a larger effort to connect and exploit
terrorism intelligence. Watch listing can now deny visas, bar access to air
travel, and block employment in certain transportation sectors; additional
uses are under active consideration. 9
These measures can be seen as variations on the more general
theme of governmental designation of the dangerous, something that oc-
3. Victory Navasky, Introduction to LARDNER, supra note 1, at x.
4. The 9/11 Commission recommended a "broad political-military strategy" of three policies:
attacking terrorists and their organizations, preventing the growth of Islamic terrorism, and protect-
ing against and preparing for terrorist attacks. NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 363 (2003) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
5. RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE 163-64 (2006) (describing the "Cheney Doc-
trine" as "liberating action from ... accepted standards of proof'). On the al Qaeda strategy of sui-
cide attacks, see DANIEL BENJAMIN & STEVEN SIMON, THE NEXT ATTACK: THE FAILURE OF THE
WAR ON TERROR AND A STRATEGY FOR GETTING IT RIGHT 12 (2005) (noting that such attacks are
often successful and that "the key operatives are no longer around for interrogation"); MICHAEL
SCHEUR [published as ANONYMOUS], IMPERIAL HUBRIS: WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON
TERROR 134-37 (2004).
6. David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (contending that "the government invokes administrative processes to
control . . . so that it can avoid the guarantees associated with the criminal process").
7. See infra Part lll.C.
8. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 384 n.32.
9. See infra Part IlI.C.
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curs, implicitly at least, in a variety of legal contexts. The most obvious
is the criminal process: criminal prosecution is the classic mechanism of
determining dangerousness and incapacitating those who are so found.' 0
Even at the criminal investigative phase, searches and stops and frisks
are frequently predicated on dangerousness, at least of a temporary
kind." Civilly, findings of future dangerousness figure in cases involving
civil commitment, 2 registration of sex offenders,' 3 and the removal of
criminal aliens. 14
Some designations of dangerousness are preceded by adversarial
process. Again, criminal prosecution provides something of a model.
Flowing as it does from that epitome of due process-a criminal trial (or
its waiver)' 5-conviction can result in an implicit finding of dangerous-
ness, so much so that a conviction is deemed to be an adequate proxy for
an individualized finding of dangerousness in areas other than incarcera-
tion. 16 Outside of the criminal context, civil commitment that turns on a
person's dangerousness to himself or others must also be preceded by a
full hearing.' 7
On the other hand, some decisions about dangerousness are made
ex parte, with no notice to the individual until they are put into effect.
The investigative stops and searches referenced above fall into this cate-
gory. This has also been true for enhanced security measures taken for
preventative purposes. Stops and searches of travelers, for example, have
been conducted on a variety of grounds, none of which has involved any
10. Dangerousness figures in all sentencing, and in capital sentencing future dangerousness is
often explicitly an aggravating factor. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 896-903 (1983). Even
before conviction, dangerousness can be an important factor in bail decisions. United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 744 (1987).
11. In fact, only those persons who are "armed and dangerous" may be frisked during an inves-
tigative stop. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 373
(1993).
12. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
13. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003).
14. Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003)
15. See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) (referring to the "crucible of
meaningful adversarial testing"). But see Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the
Rise ofAccuracy in Criminal Adjudication, 93 CAL. L. REV 1589, 1592-1613 (2005) (summarizing
obstacles to accuracy in the criminal process, including the partially countervailing pressure for
dispute resolution).
16. Conn. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003) (registration of persons convicted of
sexual offenses); Demore, 538 U.S. at 531 (mandatory detention pending removal hearing of aliens
convicted of certain crimes).
17. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (upholding commitment of those likely to en-
gage in "predatory acts of sexual violence"); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983) (confine-
ment of person found by a preponderance of the evidence to be not guilty by reason of insanity).
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participation rights for the affected members of the public., 8 Watch lists
fall squarely into this category of ex parte labeling, albeit one that is both
more formalized and less situational. Indeed, as this Article demon-
strates, watch lists represent a resurgence of ex parte labeling.
It is, therefore, time to ask if something equivalent to the blacklists
of fifty years ago is happening again, and, if so, how the twenty-first cen-
tury use of watch lists might or might not resemble the blacklisting of the
McCarthy era. More importantly, it is worth examining how the experi-
ence of the McCarthy era might inform an evaluation of our present-day
labeling of the most threatening individuals. To date, "the policy debate
about the threats from terrorism and the most effective ways to counter
these dangers has ignored the national experience with the cold war." 19
This Article aims to remedy that gap with respect to one important com-
ponent of the country's current anti-terrorism strategy-watch lists-and
to suggest some ways to avoid the worst excesses of the 1950s. A com-
parison of the two periods also serves to shed some light on the question
of whether our institutions have learned from the experiences of the past
in striking the balance between security and civil liberties.
Part II of this Article gives a brief and broad-brush description of
the McCarthy era blacklists and loyalty-security programs. Part III then
describes the operation, bases for inclusion, and uses of today's terrorist
watch lists. Part IV compares the two eras' labeling mechanisms along
several axes. This Article focuses especially on the issue of "false posi-
tives"-the identification of people as dangerous who in actuality are
not. The task of watch listing is to find the very few real threats among
the overwhelmingly innocent multitudes-the needle in the haystack, to
use the familiar phrase. False positives are a concern of any adjudicatory
system but have proven to be a particular problem with blacklists and
watch lists.
Part V draws some lessons from the past in order to address this
question of accuracy. After rejecting the idea of abandoning watch lists
entirely, this Article assesses three possible reforms: narrowing the sub-
18. The government has used traditional criminal investigation standards of reasonable suspi-
cion or probable cause; profiling of personal characteristics, like nationality, ethnicity, or religion,
believed to correlate with terrorist proclivity; and the profiling of behavior. Enhanced security has
also been employed randomly or applied to all persons. Neither of these last two bases implies any
judgment about dangerousness, but the others do.
19. Ronald D. Lee & Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond the "War" on Terrorism: Towards the New
Intelligence Network, 103 MICH L. REV. 1446, 1450 (2005) (reviewing PHILLIP B. HEYMANN,
TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR (2003)). Cf Martin H. Redish,
Unlawful Advocacy and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of the McCarthy Era, 73 U.
CIN. L. REV. 9, 16 (2004) (contending that free speech scholars have paid insufficient attention to
the McCarthy era's relevance for First Amendment theory and doctrine).
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stantive standard for selection; adding procedural protection, particularly
some form of adversarial process; and restricting the uses of watch list
results. Although these reforms are not mutually exclusive and some
combination of all three could be adopted, this Article recommends that
watch lists alone be used only to trigger investigation and other relatively
minor impositions, along with visa and immigration admissions process-
ing. In so doing, this Article highlights the relationship between sub-
stance, procedure, and effect in the law's designation of the allegedly
dangerous.
II. MCCARTHY ERA BLACKLISTS AND LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAMS
Aside perhaps from the attack on Pearl Harbor, the advent of the
Cold War in the late 1940s triggered the greatest national wave of trepi-
dation the United States had ever experienced prior to the September 11
attacks. As Morton Horwitz summarizes the period:
From the time of former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's
famous 1946 warning that an iron curtain was descending across
Europe, the level of postwar American anxiety had begun to soar.
Within a very short time, the Soviets took control of Eastern Europe
and aided the Communists in the Greek civil war. The announce-
ment in 1949 that the Soviet Union had tested an atomic bomb,
years before anyone in the West had imagined this could happen,
dramatically punctured the sense of security that two oceans had for
so long provided.... The fall of China to the Communists in 1949
and the invasion of South Korea by Communist North Korea in
1950 magnified the feeling that the world was falling to the Com-
munists.
These external threats were, in the view of many, accompanied by
internal ones as well. Even the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York, a relatively mainstream group, stated in a 1956 report:
Communism is the weapon as well as the creed of the most aggres-
sive and imperialistic of modem nations. It is a threat to the United
States from the outside, intensified by the developments of modem
science. Communism is also a threat to the United States from the
inside because of the agents it employs to do its work here.21
20. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 54 (1998).
21. Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE
FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM 3 (1956) [hereinafter NY BAR REPORT]. Cf Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 590 (1952) (upholding deportation of former members of Communist
Party) ("Certainly no responsible American would say that there ... are now no possible grounds on
which Congress might believe that Communists in our midst are inimical to our security.").
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Reaction took many forms, but the identification of suspected
Communists and "fellow travelers" was prominent among them.22 The
following presents a very abridged account of the legal features and ef-
fects of blacklists and of the federal and state loyalty-security screening
programs. 3
A. Blacklists
Blacklisting was first triggered by a series of investigations by the
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC), which called wit-
nesses and asked if they had been members of the Communist Party. 24 If
the individuals answered affirmatively, they were required to identify
others who were members or who had supported allegedly Communist
activities. 25 The blacklisting of some of the witnesses that ensued is a
colorful, if disturbing, story. Thanks to the fact that many of those af-
fected were accomplished writers, it has been fully and vividly docu-
mented.26 This brief account will forego that vast literature in favor of a
brief description of the blacklist as a legal phenomenon.
Witnesses subpoenaed by HUAC had several choices. They could
refuse to testify, which resulted in being held in contempt of Congress
and, probably, incarceration. They could object to questioning on First
Amendment grounds, as the Hollywood Ten did, but once the U.S. Su-
preme Court held that criminalizing membership in the Communist Party
did not offend the First Amendment, this course would also lead to a
27contempt citation. Because admitting Communist Party membership
could have criminal consequences, though, that decision opened an ave-
nue for witnesses to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to
testify. Finally, of course, witnesses could choose to testify about their
22. "Fellow traveler" was used in the 1950s as a term (often disparaging) for one who sympa-
thized with Communist doctrine but was not a member of the Communist Party. E.D. HIRSCH, JR. ET
AL., THE NEW DICTIONARY OF CULTURAL LITERACY (3d ed. 2002), available at
http://www.bartleby.com/59/14/fellowtravel.html. Fellow travelers were often members, along with
Communists, of "popular front" organizations-political coalitions of antifascist groups.
23. There is a vast literature on the Cold War years of the late 1940s and 1950s. David M.
Oshinsky, McCarthyism in the America and the Communist Party's Value, WASH. POST, Aug. 3,
1998, at D2 ("Few periods in American history have been as thoroughly mined by scholars and
journalists .... "). The following discussion does not aim to contribute to a deeper historical under-
standing of the period but only to put blacklists and the loyalty-security programs in a legal context.
24. See supra text accompanying note 1.
25. RALPH S. BROWN, JR., LOYALTY AND SECURITY: EMPLOYMENT TESTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 325 (1958).
26. Of the many personal accounts, see, for example, LILLIAN HELLMAN, SCOUNDREL TIME
(1976); JOHN HENRY FAULK, FEAR ON TRIAL (1964).
27. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 134 (1959); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 516 (1951).
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own activities and those of their associates. Unless accompanied by a full
recantation, this too had negative consequences for witnesses, both so-
cially and in their employment.28
After the Hollywood Ten's refusal to testify before HUAC, the ma-
jor motion picture producers promptly produced a policy statement an-
nouncing, "We will not knowingly employ a Communist or a member of
any party or group which advocates the overthrow of the government of
the United States by force or by illegal or unconstitutional means., 29 As
subsequent witnesses before HUAC and its state counterparts resorted to
the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination privilege, the studios and other
employers applied this policy to them as well. 30 Derided as "unfriendly
witnesses" or "Fifth Amendment Communists," these individuals formed
the bulk of those on the blacklists. 31 Anyone named as a present or past
Communist Party member who "did not rehabilitate himself by a
'friendly' appearance (the chief test of which was his willingness to
name all the names he knew), his own employment became precarious
and probably ended soon afterward., 32 While full cooperation saved a
person from blacklisting, it still carried some public stigma and had its
own social effects.33 Those named by witnesses but never actually called
before HUAC lived under the cloud of what was called a "graylist.
34
The blacklist soon spread from motion pictures to radio and televi-
sion. In those industries, and eventually in motion pictures as well, the
blacklist was compiled and maintained not by the employers themselves
but by private groups. The American Legion presented movie studios
with a list of 300 employees, detailing the employees' "communist asso-
ciations," to which the named employees were asked to respond.35 In
radio, a publication called Red Channels listed people with left-wing as-
sociations, leading to dismissals and non-hirings.36 Formal and informal
28. TED MORGAN, REDS 522-23 (2003); ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES:
MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA 329-30 (1998).
29. BROWN, supra note 25, at 151. See also WILLIAM L. O'NEILL, A BETTER WORLD: THE
GREAT SCHISM: STALINISM AND THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS 223 (1982) (describing the black-
list as "extremely effective").
30. SCHRECKER, supra note 28, at 329.
31. BROWN, supra note 25, at 152.
32. Id.
33. O'NEILL, supra note 29, at 224.
34. BROWN, supra note 25, at 186-87. See also M.J. HEALE, MCCARTHY'S AMERICANS: RED
SCARE POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION, 1935-1965, at 7 (1998) (reporting that state "little HUACs"
published reports listing names of suspected Communists).
35. BROWN, supra note 25, at 153.
36. JOHN COGLEY, REPORT ON BLACKLISTING 50-58 (1956). As one producer testified, "I
maintain that everybody in the book has a label attached to him, and that we-our clients-we are
not interested in using the people who are in the book." Id. at 51.
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blacklists were used against suspected Communists and fellow travelers
in other fields as well, especially education and the liberal professions.37
The impact of being on a blacklist varied, of course, with the indi-
vidual. Some of those blacklisted were fired outright; most were denied
future employment. 38 In the creative fields, a few people found work un-
der other names at much reduced rates; others followed their craft in ar-
eas, such as the theater, where the blacklists were not applied as intently;
a few moved abroad.39 All suffered financially for years, and many never
recovered their professional stature. 40 For most, years of creativity were
lost forever. 41 The emotional and psychological harm is impossible to
gauge; one indirect measure is the eleven suicides attributed to the black-
lists among people in the movies, radio, and television.42
Was there a purpose to the blacklists beyond the venting of mass
hysteria? Clearly, motion picture studios and radio and television pro-
ducers and their sponsors were extremely sensitive to perceived public
opinion.43 Were they also concerned about preventing the injection of
insidious "un-American" ideas into their productions? That possibility
would support, at most, the inclusion on the blacklist of writers and di-
rectors but cannot explain the boycott's extension to actors and actresses.
A more comprehensive explanation of the blacklists is that they were
punishment for activities, such as speech or association (and even invo-
cation of the Fifth Amendment), that could not constitutionally be made
the subject of civil or criminal sanction.44 This retribution was carried out
by private parties, but with the knowing connivance of state and federal
legislators.45 Moreover, it was accomplished without the slightest proce-
37. ELLEN W. SCHRECKER: No IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES 10
(1986) (estimating that almost 20% of witnesses called before state and federal investigating com-
mittees were college teachers or graduate students).
38. SCHRECKER, supra note 28, at 329.
39. O'NEILL, supra note 29, at 236-40.
40. SCHRECKER, supra note 28, at 359-68.
41. LARDNER, supra note ], at 192-94.
42. O'NEILL, supra note 29, at 239. See also SCHRECKER, supra note 28, at 359-410 (1998);
SCHRECKER, supra note 37, at 283-307 (academics).
43. BROWN, supra note 25, at 159.
44. This is the conclusion even of writers, like William O'Neill, who contend that the fact "that
they were penalized unfairly does not absolve show business Stalinists of political sin." O'NEILL,
supra note 29, at 251.
45. STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION: JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN THE COLD
WAR 244 (1982) ("Fear and intolerance pervaded the citizenry as well as officialdom, and official
initiatives worked in tandem with social demands."). See also SCHRECKER, supra note 37, at 9 ("In
most cases, it was a government agency which identified the culprits and private employer which
fired them."); Christina E. Wells, Fear and Loathing in Constitutional Decision-Making, 2005 WIS.
L. REV. 115, 131 (2005) ("So influential was the FBI's relationship with HUAC that one scholar
characterized the hearings' purpose as 'publicizing information in FBI files."' (citation omitted)).
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dural protection; even those who recanted earlier left-wing activities had
46to struggle to find a forum in which to clear their names. The
McCarthy era blacklists thus combined punishment for constitutionally
protected activity with blatant disregard of the rule of law.
B. Loyalty-Security Programs
During the same period, federal, state, and local governments put
into place much more comprehensive programs to screen workers for
"loyalty" and possible threats to national security. These loyalty-security
tests of the 1940s and 1950s affected far more people than the blacklists.
They were most commonly used against public workers, but their exten-
sion to employees of firns with government connections, particularly
defense contractors, gave them a wide scope.47 In his 1958 study, Ralph
S. Brown estimated that 13.5 million of the nation's then 65 million
member labor force had "taken a test oath, or completed a loyalty state-
ment, or achieved security clearance, or survived some undefined private
scrutiny. ' '48 As of that year, Brown gave a cumulative total of 10,000-
20,000 people dismissed, denied clearance, or otherwise excluded from
employment. 49 Some 12,000 others quit their jobs rather than fight their
investigation.50
Disqualification of employees in sensitive governmental positions
was no doubt seen by many of its proponents as a means of dealing with
actual threats and, more importantly, of nipping them in the bud. One
perceived danger was the injection of Soviet agents or sympathizers into
the machinery of government or defense; another was the indoctrination
of the unsuspecting and vulnerable. 51 The aim of these measures, in this
view, was prevention-forming what one contemporary observer called
"a new system of preventive law."52
46. LARDNER, supra note 1, at 193; O'NEILL, supra note 29, at 225-28 (describing the efforts
of actors Sterling Hayden and Edward G. Robinson and director Edward Dymytrk to get off the
blacklist).
47. BROWN, supra note 25, at 61-73.
48. BROWN, supra note 25, at 179.
49. Id. at 180.
50. SELMA R. WILLIAMS, RED-LISTED: HAUNTED BY THE WASHINGTON WITCH HUNT xii
(1993).
51. See NY BAR REPORT, supra note 21, at 34-35 (describing Communist threats to the inter-
nal security of the United States as including espionage, "subversion so as to influence national
policy in a way helpful to the Communist cause; and, in all probability, propaganda to affect gov-
ernment policies both domestic and foreign," while noting that Communism has not relied princi-
pally on known Party members for espionage work).
52. JOHN LORD O'BRIAN, NATIONAL SECURITY AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 22 (1955). O'Brian
saw this system as one focused on unorthodox political ideas, in contravention of traditional Ameri-
can ideals. Id. at 22-24.
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A large bureaucratic apparatus was created to enforce loyalty-
security standards. Security officers conducted investigations of both
current employees and job applicants.53 The latter could be turned down
without any notice or hearing simply on the basis of the evidence gath-
ered.54 Employees facing dismissal or denial of security clearance, how-
ever, generally could request a hearing at which they could appear with
counsel.55 To that extent, labeling as "disloyal" or a "security risk" dif-
fered significantly from blacklisting.
These hearings, however, had several unique features skewing them
against the individual. At the federal level, President Truman's Loyalty
Order of 1947 allowed dismissal if there were "reasonable grounds...
for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the
United States. 56 In 1950 this already lax standard was amended to "rea-
sonable doubt as to the loyalty of the person involved., 57 As John Lord
O'Brian observed at the time, "This alteration.., shifted to the accused
employee the burden of proof of establishing his loyalty and integrity
beyond a reasonable doubt., 58
This burden was compounded by the delineation of what consti-
tuted "disloyalty." Along with acts of treason, sabotage, or espionage, a
finding of disloyalty could be based on "[m]embership in, affiliation
with, or any sympathetic association" with a "totalitarian, fascist, com-
munist or subversive" organization or group.59 This language both insti-
tutionalized guilt by association and made a large share of the em-
ployee's life fair game for the investigation and hearing. In practice, the
most common charge was "not that of some connection with proscribed
organizations, but of association with individuals who in turn are said to
be subversive or connected with organizations named by the Attorney
General" 60a sort of guilt by association once removed. Organizations
deemed "subversive" included not only the Communist Party itself, but
also a large number of so-called "front" or "fellow-traveler" organiza-
53. BROWN, supra note 25, at 24-27.
54. Id. at 29.
55. Exec. Order No. 9835, at pt. 1, 2.a., 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (Mar. 21, 1947).
56. Id. at pt. V, 1.
57. Exec. Order No. 10241, 16 Fed. Reg. 3690 (Apr. 28, 1951).
58. O'BRIAN, supra note 52, at 29.
59. Exec. Order No. 9835, supra note 55, at pt. V, 2.f. See also Exec. Order No. 10450, at §
8(a)(5), 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 27, 1953).
60. ELEANOR BONTECOU, THE FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM 110 (1953). This
conclusion was drawn from a study of 85 loyalty and security cases "gathered at random." Id. at 101
n.. See also ELLEN SHRECKER, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM 38 (1994) ("[P]eople could lose their
jobs for merely being on the 'wrong' mailing lists, owning the 'wrong' books, or having politically
suspect relatives or friends.").
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tions. 61 Because the government considered such groups as the ACLU
and National Lawyers Guild to be "front" or "fellow-traveler" organiza-
tions, large numbers of left-leaning, but non-Communist, participants
were included.62
Further, as just indicated, personal association with one of the enti-
ties on the Attorney General's list of subversive organizations was a
ground for a disloyalty determination. 63 The list itself was originally cre-
ated and issued without notice or right to be heard on the part of the
64named organizations. Moreover, employees charged with membership
in or association with a listed organization could not challenge the or-
ganization's listing in their loyalty hearings.65 However, in Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,66 the Court held that some sort
of prior hearing had to be afforded the organizations placed on the list.
The Subversive Activities Control Board, created in 1950, produced a list
of Communist organizations but required a public hearing at which the
organization could be represented by counsel, cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and subpoena its own.67
Many of the disloyalty allegations came from sources or informants
whose identity was not disclosed to the person whose loyalty was being
questioned, a practice explicitly authorized in the orders creating the
program.68 The government rarely presented witnesses. Instead, "the
government's evidence in most cases consist[ed] solely of the investiga-
tive file concerning the charged employee," 69 which was given to the
loyalty board but not to the suspected employee or counsel. Where con-
fidential informants' names were kept secret, the agency was supposed to
provide enough evidence about them for the board to assess their credi-
61. BONTECOU, supra note 60, at 157-73.
62. See, e.g., SCHRECKER, supra note 28, at 40-41.
63. Exec. Order No. 9835, supra note 55, at pt. V, 2.f. The list was to include:
... any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination
of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, fascist, communist, or sub-
versive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts
of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the
United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by un-
constitutional means.
Id.
64. BONTECOU, supra note 60, at 168-73.
65. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 184 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (citing Loyalty Rev. Bd., Memorandum No. 2, Mar. 9, 1948).
66. Id. at 126 (majority opinion).
67. Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, §§ 12-13, 64 Stat. 987, 997-1001
(repealed 1968). Listing produced substantial restrictions, including a ban of federal employment of
members.
68. Exec. Order No. 9835, supra note 55, at pt. TV, 2.
69. BROWN, supra note 25, at 100.
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bility and that of their information.7 ° In some cases, this amounted to no
more than a statement from the FBI that the informant was reliable.7' An
employee thus could be found disloyal and disqualified from governmen-
tal employment "[w]ithout trial... , without evidence, and without even
being allowed to confront her accusers or to know their identity. 72
For many years the loyalty-security investigations seemed to exem-
plify the paranoia and overreaching of their period. In the last decade, the
opening of government archives in the former Soviet Union and the re-
lease of the U.S. Army's decrypted Soviet diplomatic cables (code
named "VENONA") have unleashed a flood of new histories of the pe-
riod.73 The extent to which these documents require any substantial revi-
sion of previous dubious assessments of the Communist threat has been
hotly debated, but it is now clear that some Communists working in the
United States government did aid the Soviet Union. For example, Martin
Redish has concluded that a "large underground Communist network
operating inside Washington during the 1930s and early 1940s, divided
into small units that . . . in some cases pass[ed] secrets to the Soviet intel-
ligence agencies. ,74 By 1946, however, before the bulk of the loyalty-
security investigations, "both the 'open' and 'secret' networks of the
Communist Party in America had been largely destroyed,, 75 although
this may not have been clear at the time. The exact level of the threat
from domestic espionage in the 1950s is unknown, but that issue need
not be resolved here.
Whatever the degree of subversion, the scope and the operation of
the loyalty-security programs were drastically out of proportion to any
realistic characterization of the danger.76 When state licensing boards
concerned themselves with the loyalty of pharmacists, wrestlers, piano
dealers, or holders of fishing licenses, something had gone terribly
70. BONTECOU, supra note 60, at 131.
71. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 67 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (Edgerton, J., dissenting), aff'd by
an equally dividedcourt, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
72. Id. at 66.
73. See Michael E. Parrish, Review Essay: Soviet Espionage and the Cold War, 25
DIPLOMATIC HIST. 105 (2001) (reviewing eleven books).
74. Redish, supra note 19, at 27. Redish goes on to state, "However, it does not necessarily
follow, either as an empirical or logical matter that most American Communists actually engaged in
spying." Id. at 28. See also KATHERINE A.S. SIBLEY, RED SPIES IN AMERICA: STOLEN SECRETS AND
THE DAWN OF THE COLD WAR (2004); HARVEY KLEHR ET AL., THE SECRET WORLD OF AMERICAN
COMMUNISM (1995).
75. Parrish, supra note 73, at 116; Redish, supra note 19, at 22-32.
76. STANLEY KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION: JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN THE COLD
WAR 244 (1982) ("There was some basis for the fears of the times, but the record of official reaction
betrays a cavalier disregard for liberty and due process.").
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wrong.77 Little or no effort was made to identify specific workers whose
presence would actually pose some realistic threat to national security.
Because Communist Party membership or "sympathetic association"
with "subversive organizations," even long in the past, were deemed to
be adequate proxies for dangerousness, large numbers of people were
labeled disloyal or security threats who factually were not.78 In practice,
these programs often amounted, instead, to widespread punishment for
the exercise of rights of belief, speech, and association. More broadly,
they were also about public shaming and enforcing societal ideological
conformity.
III. TERRORIST WATCH LISTS
Once again the American people live in fear of attack from within,
and once again we have sought refuge in lists of the potentially danger-
ous. The General Accounting Office describes watch lists as "automated
databases with certain analytical capabilities., 7 9 Less abstractly, they ap-
pear to be lists of named individuals or entities to whom certain conse-
quences are applied solely by virtue of their presence on the list. Watch
lists are used for a variety of purposes, not just terrorism prevention, and
have been around since long before September 11. This range of uses is
accompanied by a similar variety of consequences. Watch lists are cur-
rently employed against countries and organizations in addition to their
better-known uses with individuals. 80 This Part covers only watch listing
77. BROWN, supra note 25, at 377; SCHRECKER, supra note 37, at 5.
78. This was the case with the most well-known loyalty-security proceeding of them all, that of
J. Robert Oppenheimer, often called the father of the atomic bomb. Of the vast literature on the
subject, see, for example, KAI BIRD & MARTIN SHERWIN, AMERICAN PROMETHEUS: THE TRIUMPH
AND TRAGEDY OF J. ROBERT OPPENHEIMER (2005); Barton J. Bernstein, The Oppenheimer Loyalty-
Security Case Reconsidered, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1383 (1990).
79. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-322, TERRORIST WATCH LISTS SHOULD BE
CONSOLIDATED TO PROMOTE BETTER INTEGRATION AND SHARING 3 (2003) [hereinafter GAO
WATCH LIST REPORT].
80. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Jobs and Borders. 11. The Trafficking Victims Protec-
tion Act, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2190 n.78 (2005) (watch list of countries with certain levels of
human trafficking); Philip S. Rhoads, The International Traffic in Arms Regulations. Compliance
and Enforcement in the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls U.S. Department of State, in COPING
WITH U.S. EXPORT CONTROLS 2003 EXPORT CONTROLS & SANCTIONS: WHAT LAWYERS NEED TO
KNOW 501 (PLI Comm. Law & Pract., Course Handbook Order No. A0-00IL, 2004) (Defense De-
partment watch list of persons "debarred from exporting defense articles, and other parties whose
activities raise proliferation, terrorism and law enforcement concerns, it is comprised of many other
parties who are not necessarily engaged in objectionable activities, but whose listings are an alert to
apply extra scrutiny in evaluating license applications in which the names appear. Companies de-
faulting on Department of Defense contracts and made ineligible to contract are an example of such
entries."); Priority Foreign Countries and Watch List Countries Identified, 8 COMPUTER LAW. 39
(1991) (U.S. trade representative § 301 watch list of countries denying effective and adequate pro-
tection of intellectual property rights).
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of individuals. Although watch lists include, for example, persons
wanted on criminal charges or aliens barred from entry for reasons unre-
lated to national security, the discussion will concentrate on terrorist
watch listing.
A. Description
It is now the official policy of the United States "to detect and in-
terdict individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have been
engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to
terrorism ('suspected terrorists') and terrorist activities . . ." through ter-
rorist-related screening. 81 Currently, there are twelve federal antiterror-
ism watch lists for individuals. 82 As of February 2006, over 230,000 in-
dividuals were included in the database of the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), the agency that decides on watch list inclusion. 83 An
81. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD- I1 para. 1 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-7.html [hereinafter HSPD- 11 ]. Terror-
ist-related screening is defined as the "collection, analysis, dissemination, and use of information
related to people, cargo, conveyances and other entities and objects that pose a threat to homeland
security." Id. at para. 3. See also the earlier version of this policy in Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-6, 2003 WL 22302258 (Sept. 16, 2003).
82.
Watch Lists Maintained by Federal Agencies
Department Agency Watch list
State Bureau of Consular Affairs Consular Lookout and Support System
Bureau of Intelligence and TIPOFF
Research
Homeland U.S. Customs and Border Interagency Border Inspection System
Security Protection
Transportation Security No-Fly List
Administration Selectee List
U.S. Immigration and Cus- National Automated Immigration Lookout
toms Enforcement System
Automated Biometric (fingerprint) Identifica-
tion System
Justice U.S. Marshals Service Warrant Information Network
FBI Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System
U.S. National Central Bureau Interpol Terrorism Watch List
of Interpol
Defense Air Force (Office of Special Top 10 Fugitive List
Investigations)
U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-127, GUN CONTROL AND TERRORISM: FBI COULD
BETTER MANAGE FIREARM-RELATED BACKGROUND CHECKS INVOLVING TERRORIST WATCH LIST
RECORDS 9 (2005) [hereinafter GAO GUN CONTROL].
83. Walter Pincus & Dan Eggen, 325,000 Names on Terrorism List, WASH. POST, Feb. 15,
2006, at A.01 (while the National Counterterrorism Center Database contains 325,000 names, be-
cause of aliases and multiple spellings, the actual number of distinct individuals is estimated to be
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NCTC official claims that U.S. citizens make up "only a very, very small
fraction of that number" but will not supply actual figures. 84
The NCTC, in turn, supplies names to the Terrorist Screening Cen-
ter (TSC), a multi-agency body responsible for combining these federal
terrorist watch Iists. 85 The TSC was established in September 2003 to
consolidate the government's approach to terrorism screening. It is the
central contact for law enforcement agencies seeking to screen individu-
als for terrorist connections and helps those agencies confirm a suspect's
identity. In addition to consolidating ten of the twelve federal databases,
the TSC controls what information in the terrorist-screening database
will be made available for which types of screening purposes.
Use of a watch list involves obtaining the name of an individual and
checking that name against the list or lists. While this can happen with-
out personal contact, it occurs most frequently during designated forms
of screening: air travel, visa application, and entry into the country, for
example.8 6 In order to determine the person's identity with some assur-
ance of accuracy, officials must demand identification. Therefore, the use
of watch lists and the need for secure forms of identification are closely
linked. 87 Screening with watch lists promotes an increase in official in-
teractions between police and public, including stops, searches, and
checkpoints. 8 Generally, the more watch lists are employed, the greater
the need for secure identification tokens and the more frequent the offi-
cial contact with the public.
Even with the current consolidation effort, agencies still begin their
inquiry process with their own databases; for example, the NCIC for po-
lice officers or IBIS for immigration officers at a port of entry. Although
such field officers cannot connect directly to the TSC database currently,
something more than 200,000.). Cf U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST SCREENING CENTER 49 (June 2005), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBl/a0527/final.pdf [hereinafter IG REVIEW OF TSC]. The Intelli-
gence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) created the National Counterterrorism
Center. 50 U.S.C.A. § 404o (West Supp. 2006).
84. Pincus & Eggen, supra note 83.
85. GAO GUN CONTROL, supra note 82, at 8-11.
86. IG REVIEW OF TSC, supra note 83, at 37-38 ("The first step in the process when a person is
encountered domestically or at the border is that the identity of an individual is searched in a law
enforcement system....").
87. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 385-89. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-06-374T, AVIATION SECURITY: SIGNIFICANT MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES MAY
ADVERSELY AFFECT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S
SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM 38 (2006) [hereinafter GAO SECURE FLIGHT] (statement of Cathleen A.
Berrick, Director, Homeland Security & Justice Issues, before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation).
88. Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 56 FLA.
L. REV. 697 (2004).
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"the TSC exports the consolidated watch list records to all supporting
agency databases eligible to receive the information." 89 If the queried
identity appears to produce a match, the officer is told to contact the TSC
by phone. 90 The TSC call center attempts to determine if there is indeed a
positive match or not.9 1 If a person is identified as being on a watch list
or if the match is inconclusive, the TSC call screener forwards the call to
the FBI's Counterterrorism Watch Unit, which is responsible for coordi-
nating the law enforcement response, including further confirmation of
identity. 92
For each person on the consolidated watch list, the record contains
information about the law enforcement action to be taken when the per-
son is encountered. This information is conveyed through a "handling
code," which reflects the level of threat posed by that individual.93 Han-
dling codes are expressed in a number, 1 through 4, with 1 being the
most serious and 4 the least.94 The exact effects for each handling code
remain secret. Roughly 75% of persons in an audited sample of the con-
solidated watch list fell within code 4; only 0.3% were given the highest
handling code.95
B. Basis for Inclusion
Because the TSC database was initially an agglomeration of pre-
existing terrorist watch lists, the grounds for inclusion were those of the
contributing agencies.9 6 There were no common selection criteria, and
the bulk of the names currently on the watch lists still appear to derive
from this hodgepodge of selection practices.9 7 With the creation of the
TSC and other anti-terrorism agencies since September 11, a more com-
prehensive process for adding names to the TSC database has been cre-
ated. Consular offices, Interpol, intelligence agencies, the FBI, state and
local police agencies, and foreign governments gather information about
international terrorism and send it to the NCTC where it is "vetted."98
89. IG REVIEW OF TSC, supra note 83, at 38. However, TSC is developing a new system in
which it would maintain the data and not export it. GAO SECURE FLIGHT, supra note 87, at 3 1. This
system would not be accessible to the TSA, however, which would still need exported data. Id
90. IG REVIEW OF TSC, supra note 83, at 38.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 28.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 30.
96. Id. at 20-24.
97. Id. at 49.
98. Id. at 24. The NCTC is charged to "serve as the primary organization in the United States
Government for analyzing and integrating all intelligence possessed or acquired by the United States
Government pertaining to terrorism or counterterrorism" except intelligence pertaining "exclusively"
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Potential terrorists are "nominated" for inclusion on the consolidated
watch list by these government agents, 99 usually through the NCTC or
the FBI's Terrorist Watch and Warning Unit (TWWU), which deals with
domestic terrorism. 100 Staff members at those units make the decision on
inclusion. 10 The names of those nominated are then forwarded to the
TSC, which generally includes them in its database without further re-
view. 10 2 Removals of names occur through a similar process. 103
For each international terrorist name included in the TSC database,
the NCTC assigns one of twenty-five different 1NA (Immigration and
Nationality Act) codes. 10 4 This coding is designed to specify how "the
individual is associated with international terrorism" 10 5 and seems to be
the main indication for the person's inclusion on the watch list. While the
codes are not publicly available, they appear to correspond with the
grounds for inadmissibility in the INA, e.g., criminal conviction, drug
trafficking, and various kinds of connections to terrorism. Each INA
code seems to be linked to one of the four handling codes. For example,
eight of the INA codes indicate that the individual should be considered
armed and dangerous.1 6 For domestic terrorism records, which do not
originate with INA codes (these apply only to aliens), the FBI automati-
cally assigns one of three INA codes based on the existing handling in-
structions. 107
There is no official explanation or publicly available criteria for the
placement of individuals on a watch list. 08 A certain amount of anecdo-
to domestic terrorism, 50 U.S.C.A. § 404o(d)(1) (West 2005), and even then may do so at the direc-
tion of the President, Id. § 404o(e)(1). One source of information is the "visas Viper" terrorist report-
ing program, in which a Visas Viper Committee at each overseas consular post recommends persons
as known or suspected terrorists for watch list inclusion. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-859, BORDER SECURITY: STRENGTHENED VISA PROCESS WOULD BENEFIT FROM
IMPROVEMENTS IN STAFFING AND INFORMATION SHARING 5 (2005) [hereinafter GAO BORDER
SECURITY].
99. GAO BORDER SECURITY, supra note 98, at 41-43.
100. Id. at 41.
101. Id.
102. IG REVIEW OF TSC, supra note 83, at 41-42.
103. Id. at 43-44.
104. Id. at 52. Although the codes overlap, the TSDB does not allow for more than one code
for each record, potentially limiting the amount of descriptive information. Id. at 53.
105. Id. at 52.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 53.
108. ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., DOCUMENTS SHOW ERRORS IN TSA's "No-FLY WATCH
LIST" (2003), available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/foia/watchlist foia-analysis.html
(the names on the Transportation Security Administration "no-fly" and "selectee" lists are included
on the basis of "secret criteria").
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tal evidence is available, however. 0 9 The TSC Director has stated, "to err
on the side of caution, individuals with any degree of a terrorism nexus
were included in the TSDB [Terrorist Screening Database], as long as
minimum criteria was met (at least part of the person's name was known
plus one other identifying piece of information, such as the date of
birth)."" 0 In 2004, a transportation security official acknowledged, "the
standards used to ban passengers because of terrorism concerns were'necessarily subjective,"' with "no hard and fast rules.""'
It is possible to infer something about the required evidence and
standard of proof for watch list inclusion from some publicly known ex-
amples. Two of the September 11 hijackers were on the State Depart-
ment's TIPOFF watch list "in part because they had been observed at a
terrorist meeting in Malaysia."' 1 2 In another instance, an instructor at a
flight school attended by Zacarias Moussaoui has been unable to obtain
approval to fly jets and other heavy aircraft." 3
Another example is the saga of Maher Arar, a Syrian-born Cana-
dian citizen whose name appeared in a watch list check when he passed
through Kennedy Airport. He was then taken into custody and eventually
flown to Syria where he claims he was tortured and interrogated for ten
months.114 One observer describes the reason for Arar's inclusion on the
watch lists as follows:
Arar had been placed on the terrorist watch list because intelligence
agencies suspected that he might be a member of the group The
Muslim Brotherhood. The tenuous link tying Arar to the organiza-
tion was that nine years prior, well after he had moved to Canada
with his family, Arar's mother's cousin had been a member of the
group. Additionally, the United States had learned from the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police that "the lease on Arar's apartment had
been witnessed by a Syrian-born Canadian who was believed to
109. The following discussion ignores the mistaken identifications that cause people who are
not actually on watch lists to be confused with those who are, often because of a similarity of names
- which is a separate issue with the use of watch lists. See Daniel J. Steinbock, Data Matching, Data
Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1 (2005).
110. IG REVIEW OF TSC, supra note 83, at 30 (emphasis added).
111. Eric Lichtblau, Papers Show Confusion as Watch List Grew Quickly, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 9,
2004, at A9.
112. PHILIP B. HEYMANN, TERRORISM, FREEDOM, AND SECURITY: WINNING WITHOUT WAR
57 (2003).
113. See Ralph Blumenthal, With Watch List, Pilot's Career Is Stalled, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2005, at A 1.
114. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 253-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
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know an Egyptian-Canadian whose brother was allegedly men-
tioned in an al-Qaeda document."
115
If this account of the background for Arar's watch list inclusion is cor-
rect, it may suggest a more general reliance by officials on very attenu-
ated connections to confirmed terrorists in compiling the lists."
6
Beyond these kinds of inferences, in the absence of publicly avail-
able guidelines it is hard to evaluate the bases for watch list selection.
Similarly, there are no indications other than these anecdotal accounts of
how any such guidelines are applied. It is therefore impossible to tell, for
example, what standard of proof is employed or what levels of reliability
or corroboration are demanded of informant testimony.
The degree to which racial or ethnic profiling might lie behind
watch list inclusion is an especially important consideration because
watch lists are, to some degree, touted as an altemative to racial and eth-
nic profiling. 1 7 In theory, watch lists should avoid the cruder and more
offensive racial, ethnic, or religious bases often employed in profiling,
and should rely instead on more concrete and individualized indicators of
threat. 8 If watch lists themselves are compiled by such profiling, how-
ever, their asserted advantage in this regard disappears.
115. Mana Mohapatra, Learning Lessons from India: The Recent History of Antiterrorist Leg-
islation on the Subcontinent, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 340-41 (2004) (quoting
Christopher H. Pyle, Torture By Proxy: How Immigration Threw a Traveler to the Wolves, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 4, 2004, at DI.).
116. Scott Shane, The Costs of Outsourcing Interrogation: A Canadian Muslim's Long Ordeal
in Syria, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, at A10 (attributing Arar's presence on the watch list to having
been spotted walking with a pilot of Arab origin whom the U.S. believed had discussed crashing a
hijacked plane into an American building, as well as other connections to Muslims in Ottawa).
1] 7. For a suggestion that watch lists, coupled with face recognition software, be used for
screening of subway passengers, see Matthew Brzezinski, Fortress America, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23,
2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 38.
118. David A. Harris, author of Profiles in Injustice: Why Racial Profiling Cannot Work
(2002) and many articles on racial profiling, makes the following comparison between profiling and
watch lists:
Watch lists can be an important alternative to racial and ethnic profiling. They offer an
approach that is not nearly so crude (in the sense of being without an important degree of
precision) and that does not have the potential for causing offense that profiling does.
This is because of the bases for the two types of approaches. Profiles are a group of char-
acteristics said, taken collectively, to have the potential for predicting certain types of be-
havior in which law enforcement or intelligence operatives might be interested-drug
smuggling, terrorist operations, etc. It is fundamentally a tool for prediction-we use the
characteristics that make up the profile, including at times racial or ethnic appearance, to
predict behavior. This approach does not focus law enforcement personnel on the charac-
teristics such as terrorist behavior; instead, it focuses them on proxy characteristics, such
as racial appearance. There are strong reasons and considerable evidence to question
whether or not these profiles do anything like a decent job of predicting any behavior
with any acceptable degree of precision .... Watch lists, on the other hand, are based not
on group characteristics that are used to attempt to predict the behavior of some small
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C. Uses
The major current uses of anti-terrorist watch lists are for border se-
curity and air passenger screening, with incipient uses for employment in
certain transportation positions, especially air transportation. Watch lists
undoubtedly also serve in some unspecified way as a trigger for investi-
gations and also are checked in the course of firearms sales and pur-
chases. This section also discusses other watch list uses, both actual and
potential. With none of these uses is a watch listed individual notified of
her inclusion in advance of being placed on a watch list or before the list
is used in a check of her name. Moreover, even when there is a positive
match, watch listed individuals are usually not informed of that fact, be-
ing told instead only of the consequence.119
1. Border Security
Watch lists are used at several stages of the border security process:
when a person applies for a visa at a U.S. consulate, when a person at-
tempts to enter the U.S. at an air or sea port of entry, and when a person
leaves the country by plane. 120 The lists provide "information about indi-
viduals who are known or suspected terrorists and criminals, so that these
individuals can be prevented from entering the country, apprehended
while in the country, or apprehended as they attempt to exit the coun-
try.' ' 121 Some of these lists were in use prior to September 11, guarding
against terrorists or other national security threats.122 Since then, there
has been statutory and administrative encouragement of sharing of in-
formation among agencies, including watch listings,' 23 and the transition
to the TSC consolidated watch list.
group of individuals, but on the characteristics of individuals who may, themselves, be
involved in the behavior in which we are interested. Watch lists can, obviously, suffer
from imprecision; putting someone on a watch list just because he has a name that is the
same as or similar to a person in whom the authorities are interested may lack precision.
But watch lists are, fundamentally, about particular people, not groups. They focus on the
right thing, instead of a whole group.
E-mail from David A. Harris, Eugene N. Balk Professor of Law and Values, Univ. of Toledo
College of Law, to Daniel J. Steinbock, Harold A. Anderson Professor of Law and Values, Univ. of
Toledo College of Law (June 23, 2006) (on file with author).
119. See, e.g., Green v. Transp. Sec. Auth., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
120. GAO WATCH LIST REPORT, supra note 79. Recently, complaints have arisen that watch
lists are not being used routinely in naturalization processing. Eric Lipton, U.S. Test Finds Passport
Fraud Going Unseen, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2005, at Al.
121. GAO WATCH LIST REPORT, supra note 79, at 6.
122. Id at2-8, 14.
123. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 203, 403 (2001) (codified in scattered sec-
tions of 8, 18, and 50 U.S.C.) (providing INS and State Department access to NCIC's database);
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, §§ 201-202
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Watch list comparison has been incorporated in US-VISIT, the sys-
tem of fingerprinting and photographing aliens entering the U.S. at air-
ports and seaports.124 The first 1.5 million passengers screened through
US-VISIT produced "over 100 verified watch list hits,"' 25 but hits do not
automatically result in exclusion from the U.S. When positive matches
occur, the border security officials "are to contact the appropriate law
enforcement or intelligence organization (e.g., the FBI), and a decision
will be made regarding the person's entry and the agency's monitoring of
the person while he or she is in the country.' 2 6
2. Passenger Screening
Watch lists are also currently used in passenger screening to iden-
tify higher risk airline passengers. The Transportation Security Admini-
stration (TSA) and its forerunner have had a computer-based airline pas-
senger screening (CAPPS I) in place since the late 1990s. 1 27 The present
system, soon to change, involves an airline's personnel checking the pas-
senger's name record (PNR) against a set of "rules" (which appear to be
a type of profile) and terrorist watch lists. 1 28 The watch lists contain
(codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) (requiring a comprehensive database and the sharing of
information used in immigration decisions); Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C.A. § 122
(West 2005).
124. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 §§ 303-304, 8 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1732-33 (West 2005). For a description of US-VISIT, see ABA Immigration & Nationality
Comm., The Canada-US. Border. Balancing Trade, Security and Migrant Rights in the Post-9/ll
Era, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 199, 229-30 (2004). Stewart Verdery, Keynote Address.: Changing the
Face of Immigration A Year in Transition, 19 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 59, 67 (2004) (report-
ing that it takes about eight seconds to complete a watch list check).
125. Verdery, supra note 124 (citing cases in which fingerprint identification revealed a prior
criminal or deportation record). See also DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: SECURE BORDERS
AND OPEN DOORS IN THE INFORMATION AGE, available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?
them=43&content-5347&print=true. Of the 45 million people processed by DHS through the US-
VISIT system in 2004 and 2005, 970 people with prior or suspected criminal or immigrations viola-
tions were identified based upon biometrics alone. Id.
126. GAO WATCH LIST REPORT, supra note 79, at 7. The lists used were the State Depart-
ment's TIPOFF system of known and suspected terrorists and its Consular Lookout and Support
System (CLASS) used to screen visa applicants; the Treasury Department's Interagency Border
Inspection System (IBIS) used by Customs and Border Protection personnel at ports of entry; and
the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) National Automated Immigration Lookout
System (NAILS). IG REVIEW OF TSC, supra note 83, at 5-9.
127. Anita Ramasastry, Lost in Translation: Data Mining, National Security and the "Adverse
Inference" Problem, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 757, 785-93 (2006); Leigh A.
Kite, Note, Red Flagging Civil Liberties and Due Process Rights of Airline Passengers: Will a Re-
designed CAPPS II Meet the Constitutional Challenge, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1385, 1394 (2004).
128. This and the following discussion are based on U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-05-356, AVIATION SECURITY: SECURE FLIGHT DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING UNDER WAY,
BUT RISKS SHOULD BE MANAGED AS SYSTEM Is FURTHER DEVELOPED (2005) [hereinafter GAO
AVIATION SECURITY]. See also GAO SECURE FLIGHT, supra note 87, at 8 n.5 ("CAPPS rules are
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names of people barred from boarding a commercial aircraft unless they
are cleared by law enforcement officers ("no fly" list) and those who are
given greater security attention ("selectee" list).' 29 These lists have been
growing and, in April 2005, were reported to contain a total of 70,000
names. 130
In March 2003, the TSA began to develop a second-generation
screening system, called CAPPS II, which would collect a passenger's
personal information such as name, address, birth date, and credit card
number. CAPPS II would then check this information against a more
diverse set of governmental and commercial databases, including crimi-
nal history records, to produce a passenger security code of green, yel-
low, or red. 131 CAPPS II would have been a combination of identity au-
thentication (through comparison with commercial databases), watch list
matching, and data mining "by searching for patterns in an individual's
travel history that are indicative of terrorist activities."'' 32 For a variety of
reasons, including both public opposition and implementation delays,
CAPPS II was cancelled in August 2004.133 Although statistics are not
available, anecdotal reports suggest that false positives-the singling out
of innocent travelers-occur fairly regularly under CAPPS 1134 and were
a concern in the design of CAPPS II."'
The TSA is currently at work on its next version of passenger
screening, called Secure Flight. 136 It will include CAPPS I "rules analy-
characteristics that are used to select passengers who require additional security scrutiny. CAPPS
rules are Sensitive Security Information.").
129. 49 U.S.C.A. § 114(h)(2)-(4) (West Supp. 2006).
130. Pam Fessler, Morning Edition: Problems Plague No Fly List, TSA Considers Changes
(NPR radio broadcast Apr. 26, 2005), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=4619602.
131. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-232T, AVIATION SECURITY: EFFORTS TO
MEASURE EFFECTIVENESS AND ADDRESS CHALLENGES 18 (2003) (statement of Cathleen A. Berrick,
Director, Homeland Security & Justice Issues, before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation). See also Matthew L. Wald, U.S. Agency Scales Back Data Required on Air Travel,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A16 (TSA "will not use information of a passenger's credit, like a
returned check or an unpaid bill, nor any health records."); Larry Abramson, Morning Edition: Air-
port Screening Plan Scaled Down, (NPR news radio broadcast Aug. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 1382289.
132. GAO AVIATION SECURITY, supra note 128, at 10.
133. Ramasastry, supra note 127, at 787.
134. See id.
135. See Wald, supra note 131 ("The goal of CAPPS 11, the department says, is to 'signifi-
cantly reduce the number of passengers who are misidentified as potential threats to passengers or
airline security .... '").
136. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-864T, AVIATION SECURITY:
MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES REMAIN FOR THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION'S
SECURE FLIGHT PROGRAM 2-8 (2006) (statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Secu-
rity & Justice Issues, before the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk
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sis" and data matching against the consolidated terrorist watch list. 137
The plan for the Secure Flight program has been described as follows:
The Secure Flight program will automate the comparison of in-
formation in PNRs [passenger name records] from domestic
flights to names in the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)
maintained by the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), including
the expanded TSA No-Fly and Selectee lists, in order to identify
individuals known or reasonably suspected to be engaged in ter-
rorist activity. 138
Its screening will be used not only for domestic air travelers, but also
with applicants for the TSA's domestic Registered Traveler program,
which will pre-approve frequent travelers.' 39 As of February 2006, how-
ever, many Secure Flight system features had not yet been decided upon,
much less implemented, and it remains to be seen when the program will
be operational. 40
3. Employment
Watch lists already seem to be used in screening some workers in
the air transportation industry, 14 and their use will be expanded to other
positions deemed security sensitive. 142 It is distinctly possible that their
use will be extended to employees in other areas of the private sector
considered to be at higher than average risk of terrorism.
Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security) [hereinafter GAO AVIATION SECURITY
CHALLENGES]; Ramasastry, supra note 127, at 790.
137. GAO AVIATION SECURITY CHALLENGES, supra note 136, at 5-7.
138. Mardi Ruth Thompson & Kapila Juthani, Providing Smarter Security and Customer Ser-
vice: TSA 's Secure Flight and Registered Traveler Programs, 19 AIR & SPACE LAWYER 8, 9 (Spring
2005) (the authors are with TSA's general counsel's office).
139. GAO AVIATION SECURITY, supra note 128, at I1 nn.14, 17. See also Dep't of Homeland
Security, Privacy Act Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. 13,987-89 (Mar. 10, 2006) (proposing to add Registered
Traveler applicants' biographical and biometric data to system of records maintained); TSA An-
nounces Next Steps for Registered Traveler Program, 83 INTERPRETER RELEASES 833 (2006) (TSA
plans to have the Registered Traveler program operational at ten to twenty airports by the end of
2006).
140. GAO SECURE FLIGHT, supra note 87.
141. See Ralph Blumenthal, With Watch List, Pilot's Career Is Stalled, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28,
2005, at Al. See also Privacy Act Notice, 71 Fed. Reg. at 13, 987-89 (adding individuals who work
in secure areas of airports and seaports to ENFORCE/IDENT system of records).
142. GAO AVIATION SECURITY, supra note 128, at 11 n.14. The Secure Flight "platform" is
planned to be used with "persons working at sensitive locations[,] serving in trusted positions with
respect to the transportation infrastructure," flight crews, "TSA Screeners and Screener applicants,
commercial truck drivers with Hazardous Materials Endorsements, aviation workers with access to
secure areas of the airports, [and] alien flight school candidates... " Id.
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4. Other Uses
There are myriad other potential uses for watch lists. One obvious
possibility is as a trigger for further surveillance. For example, it has
been suggested that air travelers who have telephoned watch listed mem-
bers in the past year would be useful subjects of investigation. 43 This is
not impossible, but such a response would require vast and coordinated
databases and thorough investigative methods. More generally, though,
an individual's presence on a watch list presumably is based upon the
same kinds of risk indicators that would make a person a likely candidate
for additional investigation, so it is not unreasonable that watch lists
would serve as a source of investigative leads.
Watch lists are now used for one kind of investigation. Under the
Brady Act, firearm buyers must undergo background checks through the
National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS). NICS now
searches terrorist watch lists in the course of this process. 144 Interestingly,
of the forty-four firearms transactions with valid matches to one of the
watch lists during five months in 2004, thirty-five were allowed to pro-
ceed. 145
The potential for other screening uses of terrorist watch lists is quite
genuine. The recently enacted REAL ID Act 146 effectively preempts state
laws regarding drivers' licenses with detailed federal standards set by the
Act and the regulations that will be issued under it. A license meeting
those criteria, or an equivalent card issued to nondrivers for identification
purposes, will be needed by 2008 to enter federal facilities, to board
commercial aircraft, and for "any other purpose" the Secretary of Home-
land Security designates. 47 While the REAL ID Act does not so specify,
it certainly leaves open the possibility that these standardized drivers'
licenses could be matched against terrorist watch lists every time they are
presented, much as drivers' licenses are now often run against criminal
databases during traffic stops. Checking people's identification against
terrorist watch lists would almost certainly be a feature of a true national
identity card system, should one ever be implemented. 148
143. PHILIP B. HEYMANN, supra note 112, at 56 (citation omitted).
144. GAO REPORT ON AVIATION SECURITY, supra note 128, at 3.
145. Id. Apparently, presence on an anti-terrorist watch list was deemed insufficient to block
the firearms sale where no statutory bar to firearms possession was shown. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g),
(n).
146. Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231 (May 11, 2005).
147. Id. at § 202(a).
148. Daniel J. Steinbock, National Identity Cards: Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 56
FLA. L. REV. 697, 735 (2004) ("[C]heckpoints [in a national identity system] would be used either to
catch individuals already identified as terrorism suspects or to single out previously unknown per-
sons who meet some kind of terrorist profile.").
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A more remote, but still conceivable, possible use of watch lists is
as a springboard to widespread preventive detention, or extensive use of
material witness warrants, in the wake of another significant terrorist at-
tack. 149 Currently, this is just a theoretical possibility, though the Arar
case discussed above comes close, with its allegations that Arar's watch
listing led to his deportation and ultimate confinement and torture in
Syria.150 Recent academic literature contains a vigorous debate about the
propriety and constitutionality of mass roundups and detentions as a re-
sponse to terrorist events.' 5' But if large-scale preventive detention be-
came a reality, its probable emergency nature would make terrorist watch
lists the likely means to identify targets. 1 52
Indeed, the initial selection of Japanese-Americans (and other "en-
emy aliens") for detention during World War II was based "almost en-
tirely on a 'custodial detention list' of potentially dangerous persons pre-
pared by the FBI at President Roosevelt's request."'' 53 In 1950, under the
"Portfolio" program, the FBI assembled a list of almost 12,000 "danger-
ous persons" who would be detained in the event of an emergency. 54 By
1966, the FBI's "Security Index" had grown to 26,000 names and in-
cluded anti-war and civil rights activists. 55 No detentions ever resulted
from these programs, but their existence demonstrates that emergency
roundups of the allegedly dangerous necessarily have to be predicated on
a pre-existing target list. In the present era, terrorist watch lists would be
the natural source. 56
149. Several Caribbean nations responded to the events of September 11 by issuing executive
orders to freeze assets held in the names of the individuals and organizations on the terrorist watch
list developed by the United States. Elwood Earl Sanders, Jr. & George Edward Sanders, The Effect
of the USA Patriot Act on Money Laundering and Currency Transaction Laws, 4 RICH. J. GLOBAL
L. & BUS. 47, 60-61 (2004).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 114-16.
151. Compare, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029
(2004), with David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution's Blind Spot, 113
YALE L.J. 1753 (2004).
152. Bruce Ackerman defends the morality of this possibility in This Is Not a War, 113 YALE
L.J. 1871, 1881-83 (2004).
153. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS 93 (2003). Similar lists were compiled for German and
Italian Americans. Id. Although those persons taken into custody on the basis of this list were given
a hearing of sorts, they were not informed of the charges or evidence against them or allowed to be
represented by a lawyer. In practice, the hearing boards followed the FBI's list. Id. at 94.
154. ld. at 101. The Emergency Detention Act of 1950, ch. 1024, §103(a), 64 Stat. 1019
(repealed 1971 ), created a separate detention plan.
155. COLE, supra note 153, at 102.
156. Watch lists played a role in the detention of aliens in the immediate wake of September
11. Under the "hold until cleared" policy of the Department of Justice, 762 aliens arrested on immi-
gration charges who were "of interest" to the investigation of the attacks were not released or de-
ported unless cleared by the FBI. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION
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IV. THEN AND Now: A COMPARISON OF BLACKLISTS AND WATCH LISTS
The McCarthy and post-September 11 periods are both character-
ized by widespread popular fear of subversion from within. The true ex-
tent of the relevant threat in both periods is not precisely known. Most
observers (in part with the benefit of hindsight) would probably describe
the danger to national security now as greater than in the late 1940s and
1950s. After all, believing that there are traitors in our midst who will
turn over to our enemies even our most precious state secrets or under-
mine governmental programs differs from fearing that persons within
U.S. borders will hijack planes, plant bombs, or unleash biological,
chemical, or even nuclear weapons.
The most important commonality, though, is the notion that we
should attempt to identify those people who are most likely to threaten
us, to label them as such, and to bar them from the places and activities
where they could do the most harm. This Part will compare the two
periods along several different axes, both to examine their similarities
and differences more closely and to discern what lessons have been
learned and what has been lost in the area of individual rights. It will
conclude with some thoughts on the nature of the relationship between
the 1950s and 2000s in the realm of labeling, particularly the frequency
of false positives and negatives in each era's mechanisms for labeling the
dangerous. This review leaves one skeptical as to how much, if any, we
have evolved over those fifty years in the preservation of individual
rights in our national security architecture.
A. State Action
One particularly pernicious feature of McCarthy era blacklisting
was the critical role played by private employers and individuals, as well
as private pressure groups, in compiling and enforcing the blacklists. 157
At least initially, blacklisting occurred with little governmental involve-
ment. In this sense, the blacklists were a direct expression of popular fear
and the desire to punish (and distance the blacklisters from) certain po-
CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATrACKS 2, 19, 37-71
(2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf [hereinafter INSPECTOR GEN.
REVIEW]. The clearance process often involved "name checks" by the CIA, using its databases. Id. at
50-5 I, 58-62. While the report does not explicitly state that this included watch lists, that is a rea-
sonable inference. Moreover, the FBI developed its own watch list "originally designed to identify
potential hijackers who might be planning additional terrorist acts once air travel resumed." Id. at
68. This list was distributed to airlines, rail stations, and other common carriers. This list never con-
tained more than several hundred names and seems to have been culled and then abandoned within
months. Id. at 68-69.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37, 43-45.
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litical beliefs.1 58 As time went on, it became clear, though, that the state,
particularly through its investigating committees, was consciously assist-
ing private sector activists, both by uncovering names of alleged Com-
munists and by impelling witnesses publicly to invoke their Fifth
Amendment rights. 59 Those "revealed" by the public investigative proc-
ess were then easily added to private blacklists. The loyalty-security pro-
grams, of course, were carried out through direct action by the federal
and, to a lesser extent, state and municipal governments.160
The weeks after September 11 produced a wave of private, vigilante
attacks on those perceived as Arab or Muslim. In the first eight weeks,
over 1000 bias incidents occurred, including "fire bombings of mosques,
temples, and gurdwaras; assaults by fist, gun, knife, and Molotov cock-
tail; acts of vandalism and property destruction against homes and busi-
nesses; and innumerable instances of verbal harassment and intimida-
tion. 1 61 As many as nineteen people were murdered. 62 Some people
were the victims of private "profiling," such as when Arab, Muslim, and
South Asian passengers were removed from planes because flight atten-
dants, pilots, or even other passengers objected to their presence on
board. 163 Private attacks and security measures have diminished consid-
erably since the immediate aftermath of September 11.
Federal passenger screening, now using watch lists, may actually
discourage preventive measures of this kind by the general public. As
with other facets of law, the existence of a regularized, comprehensive
governmental response in which popular confidence resides may serve to
displace self-help measures. 164 To that extent, the existence of govern-
mental watch lists may, in contrast with the McCarthy era blacklists, be
discouraging cruder forms of private profiling.165 Governmental passen-
158. On the distinction between the two aims, see infra text accompanying notes 166-74.
159. See supra text accompanying note 45.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49. See also HEALE, supra note 34 passim ("red
scare" in states).
161. Muneer I. Abmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes
of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1266 (2004).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1270.
164. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retrospective
on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 CHI. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (2003) ("A famil-
iar consequentialist argument for retribution ... is that law must accommodate the retributive senti-
ments of the public to prevent lynchings, blood feuds, and other ugly forms of self-help.")
165. Implicitly disputing this point, Muneer Ahmed argues that governmental profiling of
Arabs, Muslims, and South Asians after September 11 constituted a form of "public violence" that
operated in tandem with private attacks. Ahmed, supra note 161, at 1267. While not stated explicitly,
his argument seems to be that governmental targeting encourages similar behavior by private citi-
zens.
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ger screening, to take one example, makes the kind of ad hoc private pro-
filing by passengers and airline personnel that occurred immediately af-
ter September 11 less likely. In addition, public watch lists are less ran-
dom and are subject to standards and oversight, reducing the incidence of
decisions based purely on ethnicity or religion. Governmental watch lists
are also, however, more comprehensive and encompassing than private
"screening."
B. Purposes
The blacklists and present day watch lists differ to some degree in
their reasons for existence. As the brief account of the McCarthy era
above describes, while prevention of Communist infiltration was the
nominal purpose of that period's blacklists and its loyalty-security pro-
grams, both contained substantial punitive elements. 166 Blacklisting, es-
pecially, seems to have been a form of punishment: first, for political
activity and association (much of which was protected by the First
Amendment), and, second, for invocation of the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.' 67 Loyalty-security programs, while in theory
more directly related to preventing espionage and sabotage, were of such
breadth, and were relied on in many cases with such flimsy evidence,
168
that it is hard to avoid the conclusion that they, too, were designed to
punish past belief and association.
Anti-terrorist screening using watch lists is described as being con-
ducted only for preventative purposes: in the words of a recent Home-
land Security Presidential Directive, to "detect, identify, track, and inter-
dict" persons and instrumentalities that "pose a threat to homeland secu-
rity.', 169 This is part of a wider movement toward preventing terrorist acts
before they occur, in contrast to punishing them afterwards. 70 Interest-
ingly, this same conceptual development took place during the 1950s.171
So far, the injection of retributive aims into assertedly preventative
efforts that marked the McCarthy era seems to have been rare, but there
are some signs that expression and association have figured in the inclu-
166. See supra text accompanying notes 44-46, 76-78.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 59-72.
169. HSPD-1 1, supra note 81, at para. 1(a).
170. Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1,21 (2005) ("[S]ince 9/11 the Justice Department has prioritized
the prevention of future terrorist attacks above other institutional objectives ...."). See also id. at 88
("The United States by and large was reactive and traditional in its use of criminal law prior to
9/11 ... ").
171. See O'BRIAN, supra note 52, at 22-24 (noting the shift from deterrence (through reac-
tion) to prevention during the McCarthy era).
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sion of certain people on anti-terrorist watch lists. Some listings on gov-
ernment "no fly" lists have raised suspicions of politically based retalia-
tion, 72 but this does not appear to be a major issue. The anecdotal infor-
mation about watch list formation described above, 73 however, certainly
suggests that association with identified terrorists or terrorist suspects
can land a person on a watch list. Decisions based on the suspect's per-
sonal relationships constitute a marked similarity between present day
watch listing and 1950s blacklisting and loyalty-security programs. In
fact, this practice is one of the relatively unnoticed ways in which we
have made guilt by association "the linchpin of the . . . war on terror-
ism.
,, 17 4
C. Process
Anti-terrorist watch lists are assembled through a one-sided and
completely opaque process. No one knows she is on the list unless and
until some consequence, such as denial of air travel, is imposed, and
even then the person may not be told of the specific reason for the ac-
tion. 75 No prior notice of intention to place a name on the list is given,
and, obviously, no opportunity to learn the reason or attempt to refute it
is provided. Watch lists represent a small but important part of a bigger
pattern of legal unilateralism in response to the attacks of September 11
and the ensuing "war on terror."' 176
While there are glimmerings of a procedure for correcting misiden-
177tifications, no process exists to challenge inclusion of one's name once
it is discovered to be on a watch list. In this regard, current day watch
lists resemble the early days of blacklists and security investigations
when private employers constructed their own lists of subversives but
never told their targets, whom would learn no more than that they had
172. Bruce Zagaris, EU and US Reach Interim Agreement on Airline Passenger Data Collec-
tion, 19 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 218 (June 2003).
173. See supra text accompanying notes 109-16.
174. Cf Cole, supra note 6, at 2, 8 (referring to laws against material support for terrorism).
175. The resulting feelings of insecurity invoke, on a much smaller scale, the anxiety produced
by terrorism itself. See Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Op-Ed., Scaring Us Senseless, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2005, § 4, at 13 ("It is hard to avoid feeling vulnerable to this invisible enemy who does not play by
known or explicit rules.").
176. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (overturning indefinite detention
of citizen-detainees held in "war on terror"); INSPECTOR GEN. REVIEW, supra note 156, at 19, 37-71
(2003) (incarceration of aliens, even after deportation orders issued or voluntary departure granted,
under the "hold until cleared" policy immediately following 9/11). See generally Liaquat Ali Khan,
The Essentialist Terrorist, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 47, 73 (2005) (describing unilateral extrajudicial
killings, detentions without trial, degrading treatments, torture, and renditions as "lawless").
177.49 U.S.C.A. § 44903(j)(2)(C)(iii)(1) (West Supp. 2006).
2006]
Seattle University Law Review
been turned down for employment. 178 Those persons suspecting their
blacklisting would have no remedy but to admit their Communist asso-
ciations, cooperate, and beg for removal from the lists. 179
To date, inclusion on a watch list has far less serious consequences
than failure to satisfy the 1950s era loyalty or security boards. On the
other hand, a person's ability to challenge the labeling is also much
weaker. As described above, an individual facing loss of government
employment or a security clearance was entitled to a hearing, albeit one
without disclosure of witnesses against her or cross-examination, in
which the burden of proof rested heavily with the accused. 180 Neverthe-
less, some people were exonerated. 18 1 The system of anti-terrorist watch
lists includes no such procedure and no formalized relief from mislabel-
ing.182
Informants played an important role in the loyalty-security process,
as noted above. 183 While there is no information one way or the other
about informants as sources for terrorist watch lists, it would be surpris-
ing if they were not being used. One of the stated reasons for holding so-
called illegal combatants is for interrogation purposes; this is also true
for terrorist "renditions" to other countries.1 84 Information obtained this
way, and from voluntary informants, could certainly make its way onto
watch lists. Indeed, given the aim of creating "comprehensive, coordi-
nated procedures that detect, identify, track and interdict people ...
[who] pose a threat to homeland security,"' 85 the government would be
remiss if it did not add names supplied by informants. However, infor-
mants often can be of questionable credibility, especially those facing
unpleasant consequences themselves if they do not identify their associ-
ates.
178. See supra text accompanying note 53. See also LARDNER, supra note 1, at 138-39 (de-
scribing the initially puzzling inability of Lardner's wife, Frances Chaney, to find work during the
height of the blacklist).
179. See supra note 46; SCHRECKER, supra note 28, at 330. See also VICTOR S. NAVASKY,
NAMING NAMES (1980).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58, 68-72.
181. Lloyd K. Garrison, Some Observations on the Loyalty-Security Program, Speech at the
Third National Conference of Law Reviews (Apr. 1, 1955), in 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 4 (1955). See
also infra text accompanying notes 247-48.
182. Again, this concern is different from that of misidentification resulting from the confusion
of a person's name with that of a watch listed individual.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72.
184. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 537-38 (2004) (referring to government's assertion
that military interrogations are a "critical source" of "timely and effective intelligence"); Editorial,
Revising the Patriot Act, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2005, § 4, at II (describing rendition as the secret
transfer of suspected terrorists to foreign countries for interrogation, sometimes by torture).
185. HSPD- 11, supra note 81, at para. 1 (a).
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D. Accuracy
The primary justification for administrative due process is its con-
tribution to decisional precision, and the absence of process poses a seri-
ous threat to watch list accuracy.186 In the context of identifying the dan-
gerous, two kinds of inaccuracy arise: false positives and false negatives.
The former involves an innocent person being incorrectly included on a
blacklist or watch list; the latter occurs when a dangerous person is left
off such a list. The aim of any sensible use of lists for preventative pur-
poses is to minimize both kinds of error, as well, of course, as the admin-
istrative costs of doing so.18 7
1. False Positives
To what degree did blacklists and loyalty-security screening run the
risk of mistakenly including the "innocent"? In the sense of wrongly in-
cluding those without Communist Party membership or associations, the
answer appears to be not often. Looking back, Ring Lardner wrote,
"H.U.A.C., at least in the later years of its witch-hunting work, did a rea-
sonably accurate job of identifying those who had actually belonged to
the Party." '88 This is the conclusion, too, of more systematic research.1 89
There were, of course, factual mistakes in the 1950s, but the main
kind of false positive was one produced by the nature of the system itself,
in particular its substantive standards. Listing those with membership in
or "sympathetic association" with the Communist Party or other "subver-
sive" organizations swept in thousands of people who posed no threat,
even of the relatively attenuated harms attributed to such members. As
Ralph Brown said in 1958, "[L]oyalty programs tend . . . to overflow
narrow channels, either because suspicion replaces conviction as the
186. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the current cornerstone of due process analy-
sis, made this point in its three factor balance. The Court held that the critical issue for whether a
procedure is required is "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [a private] interest through the pro-
cedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards .... "
Id. at 335. But see Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004) (arguing
that participation is an essential prerequisite for the legitimate authority of legal norms independent
of its effect on the accuracy of outcome). See also Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:
The Quest for a Dignitary Value, 61 B.U. L. REV. 885 (1981) (exploring the significance of a digni-
tary theory of process).
187. Where the purpose of the listing, whether explicitly stated or not, is really punishment, the
danger of false positives remains, but the existence of false negatives-failing to punish some of the
"guilty"-is presumably of less serious concern.
188. LARDNER, supra note 1, at 193.
189. SCHRECKER, supra note 28, at xii ("[M]ost of the men and women who lost their jobs or
were otherwise victimized were not apolitical folks who had somehow gotten on the wrong mailing
lists or signed the wrong petitions .... Whether or not they should have been victimized, they cer-
tainly were not misidentified.")
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standard of judgment, or because there is no visible standard."' 90 The
limited opportunity to test whether the government's evidence met even
these minimal standards and the placement of the burden of proof on the
individual no doubt also played a role in encompassing the harmless.
Although it is hard to prove empirically, current watch lists are also
likely to produce a large number of false positives. One kind of false
positive is the confusion of one person with another whose name (or a
similar one) is on a terrorist watch list. This is the kind of misidentifica-
tion that has drawn the most public attention and complaint. Who hasn't
heard of Senator Ted Kennedy's difficulties in boarding airplanes after
that name turned up on a watch list? 191 Some of the problem appears to
be with the name matching software used by the airlines, systems de-
signed decades ago to find passenger records without having a full name
or precise spelling.1 92 Efforts are under way to reduce this type of false
positive by, for example, using additional identifying information, such
as date of birth.193 Mistaken identification at the point a person's name is
run against a watch list is probably a technical problem that can be re-
duced to manageable proportions.1 94
The more serious issue, and one that has received much less atten-
tion, is the placement of people on watch lists who, in an objective sense,
should not be there. There is no way to know how prevalent a problem
this might be. The "standard of proof," if one is explicitly employed in
listing decisions, is apparently quite low, as indicated by the "when in
doubt, list" approach of the TSC director. 195 Whatever standard is used,
officials administer it in a completely ex parte process. Bureaucratic risk
avoidance undoubtedly pushes toward inclusion of questionable "candi-
dates," for no one would want to be known as the official who kept off
the watch list a person later involved in a terrorist incident. Even more
than the earlier blacklist and loyalty-security determinations, the combi-
nation of substantive breadth and non-adversarial process makes a sub-
190. BROWN, supra note 25, at 357.
191. Rachel L. Swains, Senator? Terrorist? A Watch List Stops Kennedy at Airport, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 20, 2004, at Al.
192. Timothy Noah, No-Fly Like Me, SLATE, Apr. 7, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2098427/;
Bob Davis, Why a 'No Fly List' Aimed at Terrorists Delays Others, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2003, at
Al.
193. Sec'y Michael Chertoff, Remarks at U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security Second Stage
Review (July 13, 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/speech/speech_0255
.xml.
194. This depends on (1) the passenger information that air carriers will be required to collect,
(2) the name-matching technologies used to compare this information with data supplied by TSC,
and (3) the margin of error used in designating a match. GAO SECURE FLIGHT, supra note 87, at 33-
35. The TSA had not finalized decisions on these factors as of February 2006. Id.
195. See supra text accompanying note 110.
[Vol. 30:65
Designating the Dangerous
stantial number of false positives inevitable.' 96 The costs are borne, of
course, by those persons who are wrongly identified as posing a threat.
2. False Negatives
Neither blacklists nor watch lists have ever come close to including
all the individuals who meet the lists' respective definitions of danger-
ousness. In other words, both lists produce false negatives-a failure to
list and thus identify people who factually come within the selection cri-
teria. McCarthy era blacklists did not ever purport to be complete. 97
Loyalty-security proceedings did attempt to be comprehensive, and a
huge governmental investigative apparatus was created to that end. 98
Nevertheless, they undoubtedly missed some of their targets. In retro-
spect, most observers would probably conclude that false negatives in
1950s listings had little actual effect. The grounds for inclusion in the
loyalty-security screening were so broad that the number of actual secu-
rity threats among those listed was probably disproportionately small.
Certainly, few instances of espionage, sabotage, or other acts of disloy-
alty by people omitted from blacklists ever surfaced. 199
Current terrorist watch lists will result in many false negatives,
quite possibly a larger proportion than their 1950s counterparts. Watch
lists are still in the early stages of composition and consolidation, and
even their staunchest advocates would not describe them as even close to
complete. Many of their targets are not based within the U.S., which
makes the collection of intelligence much more difficult. The creation of
"terrorists" and terrorist threats is a highly dynamic process, with new
participants joining and old ones leaving all the time. Because intelli-
gence gathering will only ever be partially successful and will always lag
behind events, watch listing, however defined, will be far from com-
pletely accurate in identifying potential terrorists. The July 2005 London
bombings suggest that terrorists may consciously use (or emerge from)
196. Such appears to be the case with the more serious, but somewhat analogous, detention of
suspected terrorists at Guantanamo Bay. Tim Golden et al., Voices Baffled, Brash and Irate in Guan-
tanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2006, at A l (describing alleged instances of misidentification based on
name similarity, guilt inferred from possession of a watch allegedly favored by al Qaeda, and other
cases of detention based on attenuated evidence). Commenting on these records of the Guantanamo
prisoner hearings, the New York Times concluded, "Far too many show no signs of being a threat to
American national security." Editorial, They Came for the Chicken Farmer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8,
2006, at A22.
197. As described above, blacklists were more prevalent in some industries than others and
were the product of a haphazard collection of information and speculation. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 35-39.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55.
199. The passing of secrets to the Soviet Union by U.S. government employees had ended by
the time the post-WWII loyalty-security programs began. See supra text accompanying note 75.
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what the British call "cleanskins" or "lily-whites"--persons previously
unknown to the security services.2 °° In fact, by testing the watch list sys-
tem, a calculating group of terrorists could determine which of their
members were not on it.2 °1
The cost of these false negatives is potentially huge, and the margin
of error is small. As stated in a recent review of the TSC, "There is little
room for error because a single name omitted from the [watch list] could
result in a suspected terrorist successfully applying for a visa, being ad-
mitted to the United States, or failing to be identified when stopped for a
traffic violation. 20 2 False negative costs, then, would fall on those af-
fected by any subsequent terrorist attack, including the nation as whole.
These dangers of incompleteness, however, do not mean that terrorist
watch lists are worthless. Rather, they suggest that every effort be taken
to make watch lists as comprehensive as possible, and, more importantly,
that watch lists be just one component of a layered anti-terrorist strat-
egy.20 3 The fact that a watch list may produce false negatives is possibly
a cause for objection on policy grounds, but not, as with false positives,
on legal grounds.
E. Effects
So far, one significant difference between blacklists and watch lists
is in their consequences for the listed individuals. As described above,
being named on an industry blacklist or having a negative finding in the
loyalty-security process during the 1950s usually had career-ending ef-
fects.20 4 To date, the most common uses of terrorist watch lists have been
for air passenger and visa applicant screening. Denial of air travel is se-
rious, but it is not at the level of employment rejection. The cumulative
effect of access denials might approach that level if watch lists were to
be used with other transportation or facility access controls. 20 5 Visa proc-
200. CNN, Fresh Raid in Police Bomber Hunt, (July 14, 2005), http://www.cnn.com/2005/
WORLD/europe/07/l 3/london.attacks/index.html.
201. Peter P. Swire, A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What Is Different About
Computer and Network Security, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 163, 172 (2004) ("Persons who
are on the list will then be on notice to avoid enforcement officials or to mask their identity. Persons
who are not on the list will learn not to associate publicly with their colleagues on the watch list.
Persons who are not on the list will also learn that they are 'safe' and thus can fly on airplanes or
otherwise get through screening processes. These 'safe' people can then infiltrate defenses more
effectively to spy or launch an attack.").
202. IG REVIEW OF TSC, supra note 83, at 48.
203. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 392-95. BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 5,
at 258-60.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42, 48-52.
205. IRTPA directs the Department of Homeland Security to report on "the implications of
applying [selectee and no fly lists] to other modes of transportation." IRTPA § 4012(b)(2)(B). See
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essing, especially for immigrant visas, does have life-changing conse-
quences for the applicants. 0 6 Public concern over erroneous visa denials
does not extend very far beyond visa applicants and their lawyers, how-
ever, and there are essentially no due process rights in the visa applica-
tion process. 2 °7
Differences between the effects of blacklists and those of watch
lists virtually disappear, however, if the latter come to be used for licens-
ing and employment certification in certain occupations or industries.20 8
While this function is still in its very early stages, the possibility raises
the same due process concerns as 1950s employment disqualifications.
Widespread use of watch lists in employment or licensing decisions
would repeat some of the worst features of McCarthyism. Needless to
say, some kind of emergency detention based on lists of the "dangerous"
would elevate their effects to an unprecedented level.
F. Evolution or Devolution?
It is sometimes said that in matters of national security, especially
those which may have consequences on civil liberties, an evolution takes
place from one crisis period to the next.20 9 If "evolution" is meant to im-
ply "improvement,"2" 0 this brief account of the listing of the dangerous in
two periods fifty years apart hardly shows it. Yes, we have not employed
a vigilante labeling system as in the McCarthy era, nor is watch listing
now being used to punish speech, belief, or association at a scope any-
thing like the earlier extent. But the notion that we as a society can rec-
ognize those who threaten the fabric of society remains, as does the idea
that labeling them in an administrative process is a fair and sensible way
to make that determination. Guilt by association and the (probable) use
of informants are other features common to blacklisting and watch list-
ing. Most remarkably, even the limited procedural protections of the
McCarthy era are wholly absent from twenty-first century listing. The
result, in all likelihood, is a glut of both false positives and false nega-
also 9/1I COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 387 (recommending a "network of screening points
that includes our transportation system and access to vital facilities, such as nuclear reactors").
206. Even the denial of a nonimmigrant visa can have permanent consequences, as, for exam-
ple, with a student visa.
207. See infra text accompanying note 276.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
209. Cole, supra note 6, at 2 ("[W]e have offset the decline of traditional forms of repression
with the development of new forms of repression. A historical comparison reveals not so much a
repudiation as an evolution of political repression.").
210. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000),
available at http://www.bartleby.com/61/64/E0256400.html ("Evolution" means a process in which
"something changes into a different and usually more complex or better form.").
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tives, perhaps greater in both categories than under the labeling mecha-
nisms of the 1950s. The absence of procedural protection also contrasts
211unfavorably with other designations of the dangerous.
Mark Tushnet has advanced the idea that, through a form of social
learning, the "threat to civil liberties posed by government actions has
diminished in successive wartime emergencies.' 2 12 In one way that pro-
gression is true here: thus far, watch lists have not had the same degree
of consequences as blacklists. Perhaps watch lists' current level of ef-
fects is indeed a result of the last fifty years of jurisprudence, including
the so-called "due process revolution. 21 3 Nevertheless, watch lists are
inching toward more consequential uses, and it will be interesting to see
if Tushnet's thesis holds even in this regard. In other ways, as just sug-
gested, we have experienced devolution rather than evolution.
There is another possible explanation for the current shape of the
watch list regime, one that sees it as largely oblivious of our social and
constitutional history, neither learning from that experience nor con-
sciously disregarding its lessons. Watch lists in their current form are a
response to two specific aspects of the events of September 11: first,
some of the hijackers were previously known to American intelligence,
and second, their weapons of choice were airplanes. Aviation, of course,
is a particularly fragile mode of transportation, one for which we had
already attempted to screen out the dangerous. 21 4 A third factor-that all
the hijackers were non-citizens- could also be added.2 15 Perhaps any
one of these elements would have been enough. But once it was realized
that screening for access to those very fragile vehicles could be im-
proved, that there were sources of information available for that screen-
ing, and that some of the perpetrators were not here legally anyway,
watch lists became almost inevitable. It is doubtful anyone involved in
the lists' recent consolidation and expansion gave much thought to his-
tory, or even legality, either way. The absence of any formal means to
challenge misidentification, let alone erroneous listing, evidences the
211. See supra text accompanying notes 10-17.
212. Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003
Wis L. REV. 273, 294-95 (2003). But see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accomodating Emer-
gencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 622-25 (2003) (critiquing this contention on various grounds).
213. While there is no one definition of the phrase "due process revolution," the reference here
includes that of Richard J. Pierce, Jr.; for a description of the due process revolution as an extension
of due process protections to government benefits that previously had been regarded as mere privi-
leges beyond the protections of due process, see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counter-
revolution of the 1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1973, 1980 (1996).
214. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
215. 9/11 COMMIsSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 215-41.
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lack of thought given to legality.2 16 Here simply was a problem and a
possible way to address it, or at least a way that some perceived to ad-
dress it. The very fact that in some sense watch listing is "fighting the
last war" only confirms this point.21 7
V. WATCH LISTS: WHERE TO Go FROM HERE
Should watch lists be saved and, if so, in what form? The first part
of the question asks about the benefits of watch lists and whether those
benefits outweigh their costs. The second part speaks to reducing those
costs. Watch lists' most critical deficiencies are the questionable grounds
on which they are assembled, their absence of process, and, above all,
their resulting inaccuracy. This Part considers solutions-or at least par-
tial fixes-to these problems, as well as the identification and preserva-
tion of watch lists' useful aspects. One possible change would be revis-
ing the substance of watch list selection-in other words, tightening the
criteria and standards for inclusion. A second change involves improv-
ing the process for making or correcting those decisions. A third ap-
proach would be to limit the consequences of watch listing, to emphasize
(or reemphasize) the watch aspect of watch lists.
This Article ends by arguing for the third approach. As triggers for
surveillance, investigation, and other minimally intrusive security meas-
ures, watch lists are a reasonable means of resource allocation. To that
degree, they should be continued. When they become a decisional tool in
themselves, as was the case of McCarthy era blacklists, they pose threats
to liberty and due process. For watch lists to be of much value, the sub-
stantive standards may need to be fairly loose and substantial improve-
ment in the way of procedural guarantees may often be impractical. If so,
then the consequences of being placed on a watch list must be moderate
indeed.
216. One of the few reported invocations of McCarthy era blacklisting in reference to post-
September II security measures came from Attorney General John Ashcroft, but it was made while
defending the Justice Department's refusal to release the names of hundreds of aliens rounded up on
immigration charges immediately after the September II attacks. Ashcroft "claimed that secrecy
was necessary to protect the identities of those detained, 'to prevent the creation of [a] McCarthy-
style blacklist."' N. Alejandra Arroyave, Comment, Preserving the Essence ofZadvydas v. Davis in
the Midst ofa National Tragedy, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 235, 265 n.217 (2002) (quoting Adam Cohen,
Rough Justice: The Attorney General Has Powerful New Tools to Fight Terrorism. Has He Gone
Too Far?, TIME, Dec. 10, 2001, at 30).
217. Cf John Tiemey, Fighting the Last Hiackers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2005, at A 15.
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A. Substantive Restrictions
If blacklists and watch lists are overinclusive, their substantive se-
lection criteria must bear some of the blame. For both practices, the pre-
ventative aim of listing is the identification of people who will commit
serious anti-social acts: espionage or sabotage in the case of loyalty-
security screening, and terrorist plotting or attacks in the case of watch
lists. 2 18 Designated agencies create and apply "decision rules" for the
agency personnel implementing these aims.21 9 In both cases, however,
there seems to be a serious lack of what Colin Diver calls "congruence"
between these selection rules and their underlying policy objective.22 °
The link between a person's past "[m]embership in, affiliation with,
or any sympathetic association" with a "totalitarian, fascist, communist
or subversive" organization or group-the loyalty standard in the
1950s-and that person being a realistic threat to national or industrial
security was attenuated in the extreme.22' Much of the criticism of the
McCarthy era loyalty-security programs, then and now, made this point.
The upshot was that many people with past communist or "subversive"
associations who posed no real danger were barred from employment.
One response was a call for clearer and more restrictive standards.222
A similar lack of congruence between decision rules and program-
matic aims seems to characterize terrorist watch listing. The Presidential
Directive authorizing terrorist watch lists mandates that they include per-
sons "known or appropriately suspected to be or have been engaged in
conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism
and terrorist activities. 223 The actual criteria for watch list selection are
218. This categorization puts to one side the punishment aspect of private blacklists. See supra
text accompanying notes 29-32.
219. Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626-30 (1984) (contrasting decision rules with "conduct rules" ad-
dressed to those whose behavior is sought to be regulated). Colin Diver makes a similar distinction
between "internal" and "external" rules. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative
Rules, 93 YALE L. J. 65, 76-77 (1983). Watch list selection criteria are clearly decision, not conduct,
rules. They are created and used solely by those responsible for deciding who is to be included on
the lists. Because they are not made public, they embody no intention to influence behavior, by, for
example, discouraging personal associations or travel that might cause listing.
220. Diver, supra note 219, at 67 (defining congruence as "whether the substantive content of
the message communicated [by the rule] produces the desired behavior"). See also Richard A. Bier-
schbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743, 1748 (2005) (referring to a liability rule
that captures cases "not justified by its social purpose" as involving a "definitional spillover"). See
also id. at 1754-56.
221. See supra text accompanying notes 59-63.
222. BONTECOU, supra note 60, at 242 (approving of the British bar from certain government
posts of members of the Communist Party or those "so closely associated with it as to be unreli-
able").
223. HSPD- 11, supra note 81.
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not publicly known. However, they appear to be quite loose and unde-
manding, and officials appear to interpret the Directive expansively.
224
Would adjustments to the substantive standards be a sensible way
to reduce the incidence of watch list false positives, independent of any
other changes to the listing process? Could, for example, the decision
rules for watch list inclusion be stated with greater precision? One way to
do so might be to specify more exactly just what behaviors or combina-
tion of behaviors is indicative of terrorist threat.225 An examination of
this sort seems to be in the works. As a result of a congressional man-
date, the new Director of National Intelligence is to conduct a study of
watch lists, including the criteria for placing a person on them, the mini-
mum standards for reliability and accuracy of identifying information,
their degree of information certainty, and the range of threats they should
address. 226
Without access to the current criteria, it is impossible to fully assess
the prospect of improvement by this route. Because these guidelines
must remain secret so that they are not circumvented, it appears unlikely
a public debate on this issue will ever take place. Given the great variety
of information and behaviors that might provide legitimate grounds for
suspicion, revising the substance of watch list selection is probably not
too promising a means to a major reduction in false positives. Even at-
tempting to create standardized guidelines embodying current practice
would probably result in rules of such flexibility and inclusiveness that
the chance of false positives would not be greatly diminished. In this re-
gard, the almost laughably malleable drug courier profiles of the 1970s
and 1980s provide a cautionary role model.227 Striking the ideal balance
between the general goal of terrorism prevention and the precise specifi-
cation of watch list criteria is a tremendously difficult task.228 This is par-
224. See supra text accompanying notes 108-16.
225. Even substantial indicia of terrorist threat can be wrong, of course, but, presumably, less
often.
226. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 4012(c)(2) (West Supp.
2006). The resulting report is to be in unclassified form "[t]o the greatest extent consistent with the
protection of law enforcement-sensitive information and classified information." Id. § 4012(c)(1),
(3).
227. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to
"the profile's 'chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations' and citing
cases that find suspicion in an air passenger's deplaning from the front, the rear, and the middle of an
airplane (citations omitted)).
228. On the balance generally between legislative goal-setting and specification of administra-
tive instrumentalities or techniques, see Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative
State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 408-15 (1989).
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ticularly true because terrorist watch listing is, in any event, an exercise
in prediction, not retrospective fact-finding.2 29
Another alternative for reducing the possibility of erroneous watch
list inclusion would be a more demanding standard of proof, or what the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) calls "in-
formation certainty. 2 30 For example, if the NCTC were to recommend
for listing only persons for whom there was the familiar stop and frisk
standard of "reasonable suspicion" 231 of terrorist involvement, two
things would likely happen: fewer people would be on the watch list and
fewer innocent people would be subject to listing's consequences.
232
Similar effects would follow from narrowing the working definition of
terrorist acts or reducing reliance on selected types of evidence, such as
an individual's associations or information from certain kinds of infor-
mants.
However, revisions in the substantive criteria, the standard of proof,
or the kinds of evidence considered-even if practicable-would reduce,
if not eliminate, the value of watch lists, at least for certain kinds of uses.
To the extent that watch lists are employed to initiate further investiga-
tion, surveillance, or other kinds of enhanced scrutiny, a high threshold
of proof is self-defeating. Even ordinary criminal investigators do not
require reasonable suspicion to begin an investigation; reasonable suspi-
cion may arise along the way or it may never develop at all. Insisting
upon reasonable suspicion (or probable cause itself) before a person
could be watch listed would eliminate potentially fruitful investigative
opportunities. 233 Investigation (be it of visa applicants, air passengers,
transportation workers, etc.), must start somewhere, and especially when
seeking to head off possible terrorists, that threshold should not be set
too high. A higher standard not only reduces the chance of false positives
but increases the risk of false negatives. 234 Tinkering with the substantive
standards for watch list inclusion, then, would change the nature of
229. See infra text accompanying notes 256-60.
230. See supra text accompanying note 226.
231. This standard originated with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968).
232. This assumes that the reasonable suspicion standard would be administered as it is in
ordinary police work, an admittedly questionable assumption when dealing with the opaque process
that produces watch list candidates.
233. Using a standard such as probable cause would cause watch lists to revert to something
like the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), a computerized index of criminal justice infor-
mation that contains a list of criminal convictions and outstanding warrants. Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, National Crime Information Center (NCIC), http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/is/
ncic.htm (last visited July 10, 2006).
234. For a discussion of the relationship between the threshold for finding a name match in air
passenger screening and the corresponding risk of false negatives, see GAO SECURE FLIGHT, supra
note 87, at 34-35.
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watch lists and make them less effective as a convenient trigger for fur-
ther investigation, in exchange for some indeterminate reduction in false
positives.
B. More and Better Process
A second means of reducing false positives would be to require
more process before a name could be added to a watch list. The addi-
tional procedure would not necessarily need to be adversarial; it could,
for example, involve additional layers of internal review or more search-
ing demands for corroboration. 235 Such internal review might make con-
siderable sense for watch listings, especially if used in response to com-
plaints by people who have discovered their likely presence on a watch
list.
The usual method for minimizing the likelihood of false positives in
outcome, however, is some form of notice and opportunity to be heard on
the part of the person whose interests are at stake. 236 In this instance, ad-
ditional process serves the same aim as substantive standards that are
more congruent with the goal of identifying actual terrorists-greater
237accuracy. Adversarial process with notice and response opportunities
would also satisfy some dignitary and participation concerns, which are
values in themselves. Right now watch listings are added in a completely
opaque and one-sided process. The individual is not told she is on the
235. Peter Shane makes a strong case for a "front-end fairness system" that seeks accuracy in
the inclusion of individuals on government watch lists. Peter M. Shane, The Bureaucratic Due Proc-
ess of Government Watch Lists 1, 25-26 (Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Working Paper Series No. 55; Ctr. for Interdisciplinary Law & Policy Studies Working
Paper Series No. 36, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=896740. The main elements of his
proposal are written standards governing the inclusion of targets, a uniform process for the addition
of names, internal monitoring for accuracy, and promotion of accuracy in the system architecture. Id.
"[Tihe greater the government's front-end investment in fairness, the less compelling will be the
case for highly formal adjudicative mechanisms to redress the possibility of individual errors." Id. at
32.
236. See, e.g., Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 13
(1979) ("The function of legal process, as that concept is embodied in the Constitution, and in the
realm of factfinding, is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.").
237. In this context, then, procedural and substantive reforms work hand in hand and are, at
least potentially, mutually reinforcing. For a discussion of procedure working counter to substance,
see Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible Exit Strate-
gies, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1155, I 156-58 (2005) (summarizing literature on how in plea bargaining
defendants trade their procedural rights for reductions in substantive liability, thus undermining
substantive goals).
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list, often even when the list is being used against her.238 As far as fair
procedure goes, watch lists have nowhere to go but up.
There is an increasing recognition of errors in watch list usage and
a growing interest in doing something about them. IRTPA requires the
TSA to "establish a procedure to enable airline passengers, who are de-
layed or prohibited from boarding a flight because the advanced passen-
ger prescreening system determined that they might pose a security
threat, to appeal such determination and correct information contained in
the system., 239 This procedure should "ensure that Federal Government
databases that will be used to establish the identity of a passenger under
the system will not produce a large number of false positives.' 240 It
should be "timely and fair" 241 and include a "record of air passengers and
other individuals who have been misidentified and have corrected erro-
neous information. ' '242 It appears that this system will address only iden-
tification errors, however. 243 If that is the case, it will do little to correct
the inclusion on terrorist watch lists of those who in some objective sense
do not belong there.2 "
As noted above, the McCarthy era loyalty-security programs did
provide an adversarial hearing, albeit one with the burden of proof on the
individual, who was, additionally, often denied the opportunity to cross-
238. Green v. Transp. See. Admin., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2005). Plaintiffs
alleged that they were mistakenly identified by airport personnel, often in full view of co-workers
and the general traveling public, as individuals whose names appeared on the No-Fly List. Id.
239. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44903(j)(2)(C)(iii)(I) (West Supp. 2006). See also Department of Home-
land Security Appropriations Act, 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-334, § 522(a)(1), (2), 118 Stat. 1298, 1319
(2004) (making funding for Secure Flight contingent on "a system of due process" and avoidance of
"a large number of false positives that will result in a significant number of passengers being treated
mistakenly or security resources being diverted").
240. 49 U.S.C.A. § 44903(j)(2)(C)(iii)(II) (emphasis added).
241. Id. § 44903(j)(2)(G)(i).
242. Id. § 44903(j)(2)(G)(ii). To "prevent repeated delays of misidentified passengers," the
TSA record "shall contain information determined by the Assistant Secretary [of TSA] to authenti-
cate the identity of such a passenger. Id.
243. See Thompson & Juthani, supra note 138, at 10 ("[N]ational security concerns restrict
TSA's ability to disclose classified intelligence or law enforcement investigative information sur-
rounding an individual's inclusion on a watch list."). Moreover, IRTPA does not apply to the other
federal watch lists. Lee & Schwartz, supra note 19, at 1470.
244. There is at least one statutory precedent that a watch list be corrected to reflect true infor-
mation. Section 601(c) of the Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5075
(1990), required the Attorney General to develop protocols for updating lookout books of inadmissi-
ble aliens to ensure a person a chance to challenge a listing even without applying for admission.
Recent allegations suggest that inaccuracies in terrorist watch lists also interfere with the admission
of otherwise admissible aliens. See Second Amended Complaint, Rahman v. Chertoff, No. 05-C-
3761 (N.D. Ill. June 19, 2006), available at http://www.aclu-il.org/news/press/rahman /20
amended%20complaint%20-%20Ofinal.
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examine informants.245 These hearings did result in a substantial number
of "clearances," however. Under Executive Order 9835,246 of 26,236 per-
sons referred to loyalty boards, 16,503 were cleared.247 Anecdotal evi-
dence also shows some people being exonerated at loyalty-security hear-
ings. 248 The precise numbers are less important than the general point
that an opportunity to respond, refute, explain, and in some cases cross-
examine, resulted in the dismissal of charges. Eleanor Bontecou's close
examination of a number of hearing records particularly illustrates the
benefits of adversarial participation, which allowed the employees to put
actions and affiliations in context or offer alternative explanations. 249 The
hearings thus undoubtedly reduced false positives, though it must be rec-
ognized that, given the tenuous connection between Communist Party
membership and actual threat to national security, even those correctly
identified as falling in the first category did not necessarily fall into the
second.
Despite this history, there are several reasons to believe that notice
and opportunity to be heard in response to watch listing or prospective
watch listing would be highly impractical. The most telling are the large
number of listings and the fact that most will never have any impact on
the named individuals. Notice and a chance to respond prior to being
listed would, in most cases, involve much process unconnected with any
later effect on liberty or property. Most importantly, prior notice of pro-
spective watch listing would reveal to the subject the government's in-
vestigative interest.25°
245. See supra text accompanying note 68.
246. Exec. Order No. 9835, supra note 55.
247. NY BAR REPORT, supra note 21, at 219-20. There are no comparable statistics for secu-
rity cases. BONTECOU, supra note 60, at 145.
248. Bontecou concludes, "[L]oyalty boards have been able to resolve all questions in favor of
the employees on the basis of the evidence in the files in a little more than one-fifth of the cases
which have come before them. In about two-thirds of the remaining cases the record has been
cleared following the employee's written reply to formal charges or interrogatories." BONTECOU,
supra note 60, at 117-18.
249. Id. at 114-35. In one case, a "shortsighted" witness had apparently mistaken a Socialist
Party membership book for a Communist Party one. Id. at 132-33. Bontecou based her review on 75
cases from 25 different agencies for which a fairly complete file was available. Id. at 10 1-02, n.1.
These cases were not a statistically random sample: the employees tended to have legal representa-
tion, and the "percentage of cases resulting in dismissal is also higher than that for the whole pro-
gram." Id.
250. 17 C.F.R. § 16.96(r), (s) (2006) (exempting Terrorist Screening Records System from the
Privacy Act) ("Revealing [information about a record subject] could reasonably be expected to com-
promise ongoing efforts to investigate a known or suspected terrorist by notifying the record subject
that he/she is under investigation. This information could also permit the record subject to take
measures to impede the investigation, e.g., destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee
the area ....").
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There are other practical problems. Much of the information under-
lying a decision to add a person to a watch list, if not formally classified,
is likely to come from confidential informants or other sources that the
government desires to keep secret. Precedent supports denying access to
classified material to organizations facing a listing as designated foreign
terrorist organizations, a labeling decision that currently has much more
immediate and serious effects than being placed on a terrorist watch
list. z ' It is likely, then, that much information relevant to watch listing
would not be disclosed at a hearing. Also, in contrast to the 1950s hear-
ings, which turned totally on activities and associations within the United
States, a good deal of the data underlying watch listing decisions comes
from outside the country252 and derives from sources, secret or not, who
would be difficult to produce for testimony or cross-examination.
Loyalty-security determinations of the McCarthy era used past
Communist Party membership as a proxy for a person's risk to national
security.253 As a result, the hearings turned on retrospective fact-finding
(often in ludicrous detail) similar to that of most civil and administrative
litigation.254 With terrorist watch listing, the issue seems to involve
whether someone is "known or appropriately suspected to be or have
been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or re-
lated to terrorism and terrorist activities. '" 25 5 Labeling a person as one
who has committed a certain kind of act-theft, for example, or plagia-
rism, or violation of the securities laws-differs from labeling someone
as being "suspected" of engaging in conduct "related" to terrorist activi-
ties. Because the labeling in the former cases is based upon a retrospec-
tive factual finding in the context of a definite standard, it carries a cer-
tain degree of specificity. An adversarial process that allows the accused
to meet and refute the proposed designation of dangerousness has a great
deal of value in assuring accuracy in that kind of determination. The sec-
ond kind of labeling-as a future threat-is less capable of being made
251. Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d 192, 204 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(deprivation of previously held right to hold bank account). Designation results in the blocking of the
organization's U.S. assets, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(2)(A) (West 2005 & Supp. 2006); barring its
representatives or members from entering the U.S., 8 U.S.C.A. § l182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV), (V) (West
2005); and criminalizing the knowing provision of material support to the designated organization,
18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (West 2005 & Supp. 2006).
252. See supra text accompanying note 98.
253. See discussion supra Part ll.B.
254. See, e.g., BONTECOU, supra note 60, at 96 (Derogatory information considered by the
loyalty and security boards "may include views on racial relations, marriage, religion, sympathy for
Russia or its people, partisanship on the side of labor, criticism of the Un-American Activities
Committee .. .and the parking of one's car in the neighborhood of a Communist front meeting."
(citations omitted)).
255. See supra text accompanying note 81.
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accurate through adversarial process. In fact, because terrorist watch
listing deals in probabilities, "accuracy" is less applicable a concept.
Preventative labeling of the dangerous by its nature entails large
numbers of false positives. Prediction of violent behavior in general is far
from an exact science. At best, all it can do is identify increased prob-
abilities of violence.256 While seldom expressed this way, the decision to
use preventive measures necessarily assumes a willingness to apply them
to many people who will turn out not to pose any threat. As with other
kinds of prediction of wrongdoing, such actions are necessarily overin-
clusive, encompassing many people whom are factually innocent-not
only of past wrongdoing but of any intention of causing future harm.
The criminal investigation analogies of stops and frisks premised
on reasonable suspicion and searches on probable cause illustrate this
point. As predictive measures, both deal only in probabilities.257 They
can turn out to be "wrong" in the sense that the predicted act of criminal-
ity may never occur or be proved, but in neither case does that necessar-
ily make the action illegal.258 The only question is whether the stop, frisk,
or search was properly founded at its inception.259 Frisks or arrests are
not expected to discover fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime
100% of the time. Also, it is worth noting that no adversarial process
precedes stops, frisks, searches or arrests.
256. John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prison-
ers, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 408-09 (2006) ("In the past several years . . . a
number of risk assessment tools have become available, and courts as well as legislatures have be-
come remarkably receptive to their introduction in evidence. The promise of actuarial prediction of
violence appears finally to have arrived."). Monahan describes ten risk factors common to most
assessment instruments: age, gender, race, personality, mental disorder, personality disorder, sub-
stance abuse, history of crime and violence, pathological family environment, and victimization. Id.
at 414-27. From what is known of terrorist watch listing, it is virtually inconceivable that informa-
tion on all, or even most, of these factors would be available to decision-makers. Moreover, these are
predictors of violent behaviors by individuals in domestic society, not of violence undertaken for
ideological reasons. See also Alexander Scherr, Daubert & Danger: The "Fit" of Expert Predictions
in Civil Commitments, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 1, 2 (2003) ("Scientific studies indicate that some predic-
tions [of dangerousness] do little better than chance or lay speculation, and even the best predictions
leave substantial room for error about individual cases.").
257. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (describing probable cause as "incapable
of precise definition or quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and de-
pends on the totality of the circumstances."). The same, of course, is true of the reasonable suspicion
standard of proof.
258. This is so both because probable cause and reasonable suspicion only require a certain
probability of finding fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime, see, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (probable cause requires a "fair probability"), and because civil liability arises
only when a reasonable officer should have known the requisite degree of proof was lacking, Hope
v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001).
259. Cf Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
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All of this suggests that an adversarial process to determine whether
someone is "known or appropriately suspected to be or have been en-
gaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to
terrorism and terrorist activities" will be less valuable than it may first
appear. To be sure, in some cases the individual could provide a satisfac-
tory explanation of the facts or data that got her onto the watch list.260
Such a hearing could as easily involve an admission of some or all of the
reported facts by the listed individual, coupled with a denial that they
show conduct or preparation for "terrorism or terrorist activity." The de-
cision maker would be left to determine whether the suspicious inference
was justified. In many cases, that reasoning process might not be fur-
thered very much by denials or explanations from the person herself, ei-
ther because the decision maker chose to disbelieve her or because, as a
matter of predictive probability, the person still fell within the watch list
parameters.
While more process may reduce watch list overinclusiveness to
some degree, it would also compromise other logistical, financial, and
security interests. Adversarial procedure prior to initial watch listing is
inconceivable given the absence of any immediate effect of being placed
on a watch list, that the potential number of hearings would number in
the tens of thousands, and that notice would undermine the lists' pur-
poses. Notice and response procedure might make some sense for those
whom have been affected by their inclusion on a watch list and wish to
challenge it.261 Nevertheless, given the predictive nature of the watch
listing decision and the other concerns described in this section, better
process may not be the correct solution and is certainly not the sole solu-
tion.
C. Putting the "Watch" Back in Watch Lists
If more demanding substantive criteria will make the watch lists
less valuable for certain purposes, and additional process will not signifi-
cantly reduce false positives at reasonable cost, is there any way to deal
260. Cf David Cole, Secrecy, Guilt by Association, and the Terrorist Profile, 15 J.L. &
RELIGION 267, 287 (2000-2001) ("Secret procedures allow the government to advance inferences
and charges that once challenged in open court are shown to have no basis in fact, but that absent
adversarial testing, may seem reasonable. This may explain why so many immigration judges in the
secret evidence cases have first found that aliens pose a threat to national security, but have then
reversed themselves when the alien has been afforded an opportunity to confront the specific charges
against him in open court.").
261. Discussed in Steinbock, supra note 109, at 69-75. See also Shane, supra note 235, at 38-
51; Paul Rosenzweig & Jeff Jonas, Correcting False Positive: Redress and the Watch List Conun-
drum, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION LEGAL MEMORANDUM No. 17 (Heritage Found., Wash., D.C.)
June 17, 2005.
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with watch lists' relative inaccuracy short of scrapping them? The an-
swer, I contend, is to restrict the consequences that follow from watch
listing-in other words, to put the watch back in watch lists. It is simply
unfair, and probably unconstitutional, to impose serious harms on the
basis of an ex parte process of labeling, especially one with a bias toward
inclusion in cases of doubt.262 Instead, watch lists should be reserved for
triggering further investigation, for visa and immigration processing (due
to those processes' historically different treatment in our legal system),
and for other minor impositions on liberty, such as enhanced security
inspections.
1. Investigation
Even as imperfect a process as terrorist watch listing can separate
the more threatening from the less threatening, the possibly dangerous
from the almost certainly not dangerous. As more and more locales and
modes of transportation are recognized as possible terrorism targets, this
is an increasingly valuable function. We simply do not want to devote
the staffing necessary to screen all of the people much of the time. Watch
lists have a certain efficiency, then, in directing scarce governmental re-
sources.
263
As a ground for screening mass transit, for example, focusing on
watch listed targets is certainly more efficient than searching every pas-
senger or a randomly selected sample. Using watch lists involves a
smaller percentage of the total number of passengers, and one, presuma-
bly, with a greater likelihood of catching a culprit. Watch lists also have
an advantage over ethnic profiling by being more accurate, less offen-
sive, and less likely to discourage cooperation by other members of the
264profiled groups 6. Because of the inevitability of substantial numbers of
false negatives, however, sole reliance on watch lists would be a mistake.
Nevertheless, watch lists have a role to play as a centralized source
of information, and for this aggregation of data to have any value there
needs to be occasions when that information is used. The question is
when and, particularly, for what. One acceptable function for watch lists
262. See Steinbock, supra note 109, at 69-75.
263. The Registered Traveler program does this not by focusing on the most suspicious but by
relaxing scrutiny of the least suspicious. See supra text accompanying note 139.
264. Editorial, Terrorism and the Random Search, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2005, at A16 (urging
that subway searches be continued and conducted in "an evenhanded manner," while noting that
"[finding a way to treat people fairly and still pursue any real threat is a particularly difficult and
important task"). Watch lists are a less discriminatory alternative, of course, only if racial and ethnic
profiling do not play a significant role in their compilation. On that possibility, see supra text ac-
companying notes 117-18.
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is as a sorting mechanism, designating who may be exposed to certain
investigative or security procedures. The Fourth Amendment and the
Due Process Clause provide rough measures of the allowable degree of
intrusion into one's personal affairs that one's presence on watch lists
might instigate in the absence of any other proof of wrongdoing. The
simple placement of a name on a watch list offends neither constitutional
provision. Once the list is assembled, it may be used to trigger investiga-
tive and administrative measures that do not constitute Fourth Amend-
ment searches or seizures or infringements of life, liberty, or property
under the Due Process Clause. These include:
* conducting public surveillance: following the individual;
* performing electronic monitoring: installation of a radio transmitter
on his/her belongings;
* collecting publicly available documentary and physical evidence;
* interviewing the individual and her associates and other witnesses;
* requesting consent to search;
* compelling the individual to appear before a grand jury; and
0 imposing other burdens, such as enhanced security screening, that do
not significantly affect liberty or property interests or are acceptable ad-
ministrative searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.
In addition, other more intrusive actions, such as stops, frisks,
searches, or arrests, may be employed if the information behind a watch
listing contains the requisite level of proof.265 This seems to be the thrust
of the "handling codes" assigned to each name on the TSC's consoli-
dated terrorist watch list.266 This kind of"watching"-employing the full
range of constitutionally and statutorily permitted investigative and sur-
veillance powers-is certainly allowable simply on the basis of watch
267listing. Obviously, if the investigation turns up additional indications
of wrongdoing, other measures become available.
265. United States v. Koubriti, 199 F. Supp. 2d. 656, 664 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (occupant's pres-
ence on FBI terrorist watch list justified protective sweep of apartment on September 17, 2001). Cf
Bimbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 971-72 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (presence of name of mail
recipient or sender on FBI or CIA watch list of "suspect persons" does not constitute probable cause
to seize and search mail).
266. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95. The author has a Freedom of Information Act
request for a description of the handling codes pending.
267. As with other governmental investigations, those triggered by watch lists can erroneously
fail to detect criminality. For an example, see SIBLEY, supra note 74, at 121-24 (reporting the case
of Gregory Silvermaster, a Communist spy on the Dies Committee's list of suspected government
employees who was cleared after several investigations and who continued to supply documents to
the Soviet Union while employed by the U.S.).
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The main drawback of this suggested limitation, of course, is that
many of these permissible methods are labor-intensive. Without a vast
increase in law enforcement staffing, these methods could not be applied
to more than a small fraction of those individuals on current watch
lists. 268 Even if accurate, a terrorist watch list that does not instigate some
governmental action will not prevent anything. Nevertheless, surveil-
lance or other kinds of investigation of some of those on the watch lists,
especially those in the U.S. who have the most serious handling codes,
would be one possible approach. If more agents are needed, then so be it;
many security costs have increased drastically since September 11.
Increasing the number of encounters during which a person's name
is checked against the watch list is one way to enhance the usefulness of
watch lists.2 69 A step in that direction is contained in IRTPA, which calls
for consideration of the possibility of using watch lists for other modes of
transportation besides air travel.27 ° Subway rider searches, instigated in
London and New York after the July 2005 London bombings, are not
currently based on watch lists, 271' but watch list use could become the
next stage in this practice. Effective checking of names against watch
lists, however, requires that every person carry an accurate and secure
form of identification. Thus, the greater the reliance on watch lists, the
more likely will be the demand for a national identity card that everyone
272must carry. As air travelers' experience has demonstrated, expansion
to other transportation modes would increase the number of identifica-
tion checkpoints and their attendant delays, as well as diminishing the
feeling of living in a free society. Regular identity checks would also
drive those without lawful identification further into the shadows.273
268. HEYMANN, supra note 112, at 76.
269. Cf Swire, supra note 201, at 172 (2004) ("Putting the watch list into the hands of more
defenders increases the likelihood of spotting and capturing the attacker.").
270. See supra note 205.
271. MacWade v. Kelly, No. 05CIV6921, 2005, 2005 WL 3338573, at *5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7,
2005) (passengers' containers searched according to a predetermined random frequency, e.g., every
fourth passenger).
272. See, e.g., DAVID FRUM & RICHARD PERLE, AN END TO EVIL: HOW TO WIN THE WAR ON
TERROR 71-72 (2003) (advocating comparisons of national identity cards with terrorist watch lists);
AMITAI ETZIONI, How PATRIOTIC IS THE PATRIOT ACT? FREEDOM VERSUS SECURITY IN THE AGE
OF TERRORISM 98 (2004) (arguing that current means of establishing identification in the U.S. are
"woefully inadequate"); Editorial, A National ID, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2004, at A 16 (advocating
that a commission be established to study "how to create a card that helps identify people but doesn't
rob them of a huge swath of their civil liberties in the process."). Cf BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND
FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN INSECURE WORLD 204-06 (2003) (analyzing a
possible national identity card system and concluding that it would not be worth the cost).
273. Patrick McGeehan, A Week of Random Backpack Searches Yields Little Drama, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 2005, at B 1 (reporting that Hispanic immigrants were avoiding the New York sub-
ways during the random searches for fear of being asked to document their presence in the U.S.).
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2. Visa and Admissions Processing
In addition to the investigative methods listed above, the only other
acceptable use of watch lists as presently constituted would be visa and
immigration admissions processing. This is not because the conse-
quences of visa or admissions denial are slight; they can be quite serious,
especially with respect to immigrant applicants.27 4 Rather, this conclu-
sion relies on two factors. First, there is the long-standing deference to
consular discretion and the traditional absence of formal administrative
review of visa denials.275 Due process rights do not apply, and judicial
review is generally unavailable, in visa processing, even when factual
errors in visa denial are alleged.276 Using watch lists in consular visa de-
cisions, then, is consistent with our legal culture and, implicitly, with a
historically greater tolerance for false positives in the visa denial process.
Second, visa and admissions screening is both an enormous task
and one with an immediate impact on anti-terrorism efforts. All Septem-
ber 11 hijackers were non-Americans,277 and many (though not all) of
those in recent European bombings were not citizens of those coun-
tries. 278 It will be impossible to prove, but some of the reason why the
U.S. has not suffered further attacks may lie in the enhanced anti-terrorist
screening of visa applicants and the generally greater difficulty in obtain-
ing visas since September 1 1.279 Applications for non-immigrant visas
(e.g., tourists, students, and other temporary visitors) come in greater
numbers than immigrant applications and generally involve lesser private
interests, especially on the part of U.S citizens or residents. An unwill-
ingness to rely on watch lists in making those decisions would be very
expensive, very time-consuming, and not particularly protective of U.S.
interests.
However, the mere fact of listing alone, resting as it often would on
a chain of hearsay, should not be enough to sustain a finding of inadmis-
274. U.S. COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION REFORM, BECOMING AN AMERICAN: IMMIGRATION AND
IMMIGRANT POLICY 180-82 (1997) (noting the interests at stake for the visa applicant and U.S.
petitioners), available at http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/uscir/becoming/full-report.pdf.
275. Immigration and Nationality Act § 104(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1201(g) (2000).
276. See, e.g., Loza-Bedoya v. INS, 410 F.2d 343, 347 (9th Cir. 1969) (discussing that a claim
to overturn a visa denial based upon erroneous information in records was nonjusticiable).
277. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 215-41.
278. Renwick McClean, Unsent E-Mail Helped Plotters Coordinate Madrid Bombings, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 30, 2006, at A12. Most of the 29 suspects were from North Africa. Id.
279. BENJAMIN & SIMON, supra note 5, at 115. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The Ethnic and
Religious Profiling of Noncitizens: National Security and International Human Rights, 25 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 161, 175-76 (2005) (summarizing the country-specific strategies, the injection of
the Department of Homeland Security into the visa process, and the heightened screening and delay
since September 11).
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sibility on terrorism-related grounds if challenged at a hearing. On the
other hand, the information underlying the person's watch listing might
very well be considered sufficient for a such a finding.280 Although non-
resident aliens have no constitutional due process right to a hearing,
watch list instigated allegations of inadmissibility at a U.S. port of entry
would usually entitle an alien to a removal hearing by statute. 28 A watch
listing is usually based on multiple hearsay, and although hearsay is ac-
ceptable in a removal proceeding if it is material and relevant, 2  reliance
on multiple, unreliable hearsay may violate due process.283 Listing
should, however, be enough to trigger such a hearing.
Beyond visa processing, criminal or national security investigation,
and some minor impositions on liberty or property such as enhanced
searches, watch list matches should not carry automatic effects. The
process of watch listing is both insufficiently discriminating and too one-
sided to result in denial of important liberty or property rights, such as
the right to take certain forms of transportation (e.g., air, bus, and sub-
way) or the right to engage in certain occupations. I have argued else-
where that imposing these harms by reason of matching a name with a
watch list violates the Due Process Clause. 284
3. Employment
The improper denial of important liberty and property rights due to
one's inclusion on a blacklist is one of the lessons of the McCarthy era,
especially regarding employment. Even during the 1950s, the Supreme
Court held that disqualification from government employment for mem-
bership in a listed subversive organization offended due process, unless,
at the least, the employee was shown to have been aware of the organiza-
tion's activities and purposes.285 The Court recognized early on that in
addition to being denied the job itself, such disqualification imposed a
"badge of infamy." 286 Where that effect on reputation was not present,
280. Cf Mapother v. Dep't of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1542-44 (D.C. Cir 1993) (assuming that
the evidence underlying the watch listing of Kurt Waldheim as a Nazi war criminal and barring him
from the United States (and not just the fact of listing) would be offered in any exclusion proceed-
ing).
281. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) (2000).
282. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.7 (2006).
283. See, e.g., Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405-08 (3d Cir. 2003); Cunanan v. INS,
856 F.2d 1373, 1375 (9th Cir. 1988).
284. Steinbock, supra note 109, at 59-60. But see Green v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 351 F. Supp.
2d 1119, 1130 (W.D. Wash. 2005) (holding that No Fly impediments to air travel do not violate due
process liberty interests).
285. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 218-19 (1952).
286. Id. at 218.
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the Court, however, allowed what amounted to dismissal on security
grounds without a hearing.2 87 Denial of a license to practice an occupa-
tion was also held to implicate due process rights.2
88
In the intervening years, the right to a hearing before being dis-
qualified from public employment has only increased.289 While whether a
hearing must be held before or after suspension from work is an issue,290
there is no question that notice and an opportunity to be heard are consti-
tutionally required before a person can be removed permanently from
employment that is not held at will. 29' A public employee could not,
therefore, ordinarily be dismissed from a job for no more than her inclu-
sion on a watch list. 292 The same would apply to licensing. Dismissal
from public employment or denial of occupational licensing based on
anonymous and un-cross-examined allegations appears to be an aban-
doned relic of the McCarthy era.293 This is as it should be, given the sub-
stantial private interest at stake and the high risks of error. Incipient steps
toward using watch lists to bar people from licenses or employment in
the transportation industry 9 or other fields considered special terrorist
targets, therefore, should be rejected on both policy and constitutional
grounds.295
VI. CONCLUSION
The McCarthy and post-September 1 1 eras are times of menace,
and perhaps more importantly, fear of menace. Though the nature and
287. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898-99 (1961) (finding that
dismissal on "security" grounds from food service position on military base, without further specifi-
cation, did not impair other employment opportunities.)
288. Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957).
289. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1972).
290. Compare Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985), with Gilbert v.
Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 934 (1997), and Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 65 (1979).
291. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 ; Roth, 408 U.S. at 569-70.
292. The information underlying the watch listing, of course, could be the basis for employ-
ment termination under relevant standards if presented in a hearing. If the government chooses not to
disclose confidential information that would prove the grounds for the dismissal, then it, rather than
the employee, should suffer the loss. The opposite seems to be the case when the dismissed em-
ployee sues the government. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604 (1988) (referring to the need "to
balance [an employee's] need for access to proof ... against the extraordinary needs of the CIA for
confidentiality and the protection of its methods, sources, and mission"); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d
338, 348-49 (4th Cir. 2005) (dismissing former CIA officer's Title VII case because it would require
disclosure of state secrets concerning CIA operations).
293. See supra text accompanying notes 70-72.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
295. These conclusions apply to watch lists as they now operate. They would change if, for
example, watch listing were preceded by an adversarial process. A fundamental corollary of the
three factor balance of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), is that an increase in process
will allow a greater impact on private interests, just as the reverse is also true.
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degree of their threats may differ, the two periods share an intense public
desire to identify and apprehend those individuals who are bent on un-
dermining our most basic security before they act. Our enemies, while
few in number, attempt to lurk among the population at large. How then
are we to find these dangerous few needles in a vast haystack of the in-
nocent? In particular, what should the process to designate these suspi-
cious individuals entail?
In both periods, the country turned to administrative measures to
label those perceived to be the greatest risks.296 The blacklisting and loy-
alty-security investigations of the McCarthy era are now widely viewed
as, if not completely unnecessary, at least wildly overinclusive and
297trenching on First Amendment and due process rights. Have we
learned from the excesses of that time as we ramp up anti-terrorist watch
lists-the blacklists of today?
On the one hand, the private sanctions of the McCarthy era, most
strikingly embodied in industry blacklists, largely have been avoided. On
the other hand, watch listing has both repeated some of the failings of the
McCarthy era and moved on to develop some new ones of its own. In the
former category lies the use of vague and overbroad standards for label-
ing people as dangerous. This practice seems to be coupled ("seems" in
the case of watch lists because their criteria are not public) with the use
of behavioral proxies for threat, often in the form of personal associa-
tions. All of this amounts, in both cases, to a net cast so widely that it
catches many, many dolphins along with, perhaps, a few sharks.
The McCarthy era employed a vast apparatus to separate these two
categories in its loyalty-security investigations. Although the procedures
did not totally mitigate the effects of their vague criteria, and although
they were skewed against the individual, the loyalty-security determina-
tions did provide the accused some opportunity to respond to allegations
of security risk. Nevertheless, many people who posed absolutely no
peril to U.S. security suffered grievous harm. Anti-terrorist watch listing
has regressed in that it involves opaque, completely ex parte labeling-a
technique that is quicker and cheaper than that used in the 1950s but
even less fair. As a predictive method that appears to tolerate fairly low
probabilities of accuracy, watch listing assumes-and, so far, accepts-a
high number of false positives. This problem could be mitigated some-
what by more restrictive criteria or by adding some adversarial process,
296. Cole, supra note 6, at 3 (remarking on the resort to administrative sanctions in reaction to
the attacks of September 11).
297. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 19, at 15 (concluding that "the American government was
responsible for wholly unjustified political repression of an unpopular ideology, in a manner omi-
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but the costs of both are not inconsiderable. Under these circumstances,
the critical issue with watch lists and other designations of the putatively
dangerous is just what consequence that label should carry.
As this Article has shown, anti-terrorist watch lists can serve some
useful functions, such as separating individuals deserving of increased
investigative attention from those who are not. Watch lists will never be
complete, or completely accurate, but they serve as a place to start. They
should not, however, be the ground for consequences more serious than
the denial of a visa, the initiation of an investigation, or minor imposi-
tions on liberty involving delay, but not denial, of access to locations or
transportation. If their role is seen as one. of limitation as well as oppor-
tunity, watch lists can and should be preserved. Their restriction to these
uses would avoid the McCarthy era's insidious combination of a vague
standard, little process, and serious consequences. Designating a list of
people to watch is an acceptable part of a larger anti-terrorism strategy-
a component that can help protect the country without repeating one of
its darker chapters.
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